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The Growth and Development of the Modem Egyptian Financial Sector 
Bruce J S Macpherson 
This thesis focuses on the Egyptian financial sector during the period between the 
Egyptian Revolution of 1952 and the late 1980's. This was a period during which 
the country's political leaders sought to administer the economy by a variety of 
different means, all of which had a marked impact on the manner in which the 
financial sector was able to operate. An attempt is made to assess the nature of the 
changes to which the sector was subject, the manner in which the changes shaped 
financial operations and the potential of the sector to contribute to the removal, or 
alleviation of some of the problems faced by Egypt today. 
The techniques employed in pursuit of these objectives are various, concentrating 
initially on an examination of the 'ideal' role of the 'ideal' financial sector, the path 
of sectoral development commonly charted within the developing world, and some of 
the problems faced typically by financial sectors in the wake of such historic 
developmental experience. The thesis then goes on to discuss Egypt in particular -
the background of foreign commercial banking which characterised the sector before 
the Revolution, and the impact of Gamal Abd al-Nasser's reforms - Egyptianisation, 
sequestration, nationalisation and central planning. President Sadat's Open Door 
Economic Policy is also examined. This leads to an assessment of economic 
conditions today. The activities of the sector are then discussed along with the 
regulatory environment imposed by the Central Bank and the government. 
The main findings of this study, discussed in the penultimate chapter, suggest that 
whilst the financial sector has undoubtedly grown and developed, the general 
political, social and economic environment in which it has had to operate has 
prevented it from realising fully its potential. Liquidity stands in excess of 130%, 
and this in itself points to a lack of both confidence and perceived investment 
opportunities. Suggested areas of reform to enhance financial performance and 
improve confidence are described, reflecting the opinions of a range of financiers and 
others working in Egypt today. 
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from it should be acknowledged. 
The Growth and Development 
of the 
Modern Egyptian Financial Sector 
Bruce James Stewart Macpherson 
Thesis submitted for the degree MA 
University of Durham 
Department of Economics 
1993 
FEB 1994 
None of the material mentioned in this thesis has previously been 
submitted for a degree at this or any other university. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation 
from it should be published without prior written consent and 
information derived from it should be acknowledged. 
This craft is dedicated to all those inspirational forces 
who helped fuel and fire me during the lengthy course of its production. 
Whether they be of Gilesgate Moor, The Graduate Society, 
Edinburgh, London, the Channel Islands, Baghdad or Cairo -
- to them all I owe a great debt of gratitude, 
for time well spent in their company. 
The Growth and Development of the Modern Egyptian Financial Sector 
Chapter 1 Introduction and Statement of Inquiry p 9 
1.1 Economic Background p 9 
1.2 The Contribution of Finance p 14 
1.3 The Statement of Inquiry p 15 
Chapter 2 Finance and Development p 17 
2.1 Financial Systems and Development p 18 
2.2 Saving and Development p 20 
2.3 Foreign Commercial Banks in the Developing World p 25 
2.4 State-led Approaches to Financial Development p 27 
2.5 The Consequences of Intervention p 31 
Chapter 3 Financial and Economic Development in Egypt p 36 
3.1 The Origins of Financial Development p 36 
3.2 The Policies of Nationalisation and Central Planning p 41 
3.3 The Role of the Financial Sector during the Nasser Era p 50 
3.4 The Open Door Economic Policy p 55 
3.5 Economic Considerations Today p 69 
Cliapter 4 The Financial Sector Today p 77 
4.1 The Structure of the Banking Sector p 77 
4.2 The Regulatory Environment p 80 
4.3 Commercial Banks p 83 
4.4 Business and Investment Banks p 88 
4.5 Specialised Banks p 94 
4.6 Insurance Companies p 99 
4.7 Islamic Institutions p 101 
4.8 The Stock Exchange p 103 
Chapter 5 The Operatmg Clunate p 107 
5.1 Introduction p 108 
5.2 Management of Domestic Public Debt p 113 
5.3 Monetary Policy p 114 
5.4 Management of the Public Business Sector p 115 
5.5 Other issues p 118 
Chapter 6 Conclusions p 121 
Books consulted p 126 
General publications, papers, articles and reports consulted p 128 
Individuals / representatives of institutions consulted p 131 
Institutions consulted p 132 
List of Tables: 
3.1 The main commercial banks in operation 1856 - 1920 p 38 
3.2 Designated areas of specialisation for public sector banks p 45 
3.3 Shares in GDP at market prices 1952 - 1970 p 48 
3.4 Foreign exchange sources 1976 - 1986/87 p 64 
3.5 GDP in 1991/92 compared to the targeted in 1987/88 
and the expected in 1986/87 at 1986/87 prices p 71/72 
3.6 Investment expenditure by economic sectors in five year plan 
1987/88 - 1991/92 pp 74/75 
4.1 The structure of the Egyptian banking sector p 78 
4.2 The aggregate financial position of Commercial Banks, 1989 p 85 
4.3 The aggregate financial position of Business and 
Investment Banks, 1989 p 89 
4.4 Loans and discount balances granted by Commercial Banks 
and Business and Investment Banks, 1989 pp 92/93 
4.5 Aggregate financial position of Specialised Banks, 1989 p 95 
4.6 Loans granted by Specialised Banks, 1989 p 97 
4.7 Investments of the Insurance Sector, 1989 p 100 
4.8 Historical market value of bond and share trading p 104 
Chapter 1 Introduction and Statement of Inquiry 
Egypt, like so many other 'developing' states, has in recent decades been striving to 
come to terms with herself. The struggle has not only been against and alongside the 
aspirations of her people and the different ideologies they have adopted and 
engendered but that of her place within the region and, indeed, the wider world 
itself. 
The struggle is rooted in historical identity and pride, independence and hope, reality 
and a possibly grudging acceptance of the surrounding world. The process is 
ceaseless, and through it and time, the Egyptians have seen their political masters 
turn from the ideological forces of nationalism and Arab socialism to that of a 
possibly freer, yet lukewarmly accepted and applied system of capitalism. This is a 
process whereby the market, or the prevailing world economic order is required to be 
acknowledged as the determining factor in the process of allocating resources and 
their distribution, providing not only daily bread but also a means to an end. 
1.1 The Ekronomic Background 
Economic historians of contemporary Egypt tend to recognise a variety of distinct 
phases through which the economy and economic planning have passed since the 
Revolution of 1952. 
When the Revolution dawned, the economy was dominated by the private sector, the 
state's role being limited to investment in the infrastructure and the social services. 
Such a balance was initially maintained by the new regime and the private sector 
continued to enjoy a high degree of government protection, as had happened in the 
period immediately after World War I I . Not having any clear or concise economic 
objectives, the Free Officers' agrarian reforms of 1952 and 1961 are not generally 
considered to have been directed towards destabilising or restricting a particular part 
of the economy. Rather, the reforms are seen as an attempt on the part of the Free 
Officers to reduce the power base of potential political opponents, and at the same 
time channel financial resources towards the industrial sector. 
The period 1957-60 was marked by the implementation of policies which, although 
not necessarily designed to inhibit the role of the private sector, certainly had such an 
effect, in that they permitted extensive state intervention and control. The Suez 
Crisis, its political ramifications and the subsequent seizure of foreign assets created 
short-term difficulties. Nevertheless, in the longer term, the crisis served a useful 
purpose when the government launched a five year plan for industrial development 
requiring substantial financial support. This support would not otherwise have been 
forthcoming. 
The implementation of the 'First Five Year Plan for Economic and Social 
Development' in 1960 marked the introduction of a period characterised by even 
greater state control. The policies by which Abd al-Nasser's regime and 
administration are perhaps best remembered, Egyptianisation and nationalisation, 
were implemented on a massive scale. Legislation ensured that virtually everything, 
bar agriculture, was controlled by the state. 
For thirteen years Abd al-Nasser's vision of Arab socialism remained the foundation 
upon which economic policy and planning in Egypt were based. President Anwar 
Sadat brought this to an abrupt end in 1973 when he introduced the Open Door 
Economic Policy (ODEP). With the economy and national will debilitated by the 
costs of war, the ODEP was aimed primarily at revitalising the private sector, 
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altering the nature and direction of trade and encouraging large scale Arab and 
foreign investment. 
Since the mid-1970s there have been no further attempts to bring about significant 
change to the economic structure or policy of Egypt. President Sadat's reforms met 
with varying degrees of success and, today, Husni Mubarak lives with the 
consequences of his predecessors' policies. He is urged by economic realities, his 
actions nevertheless tempered by political and social reality, to come to terms with a 
host of problems currently burdening the country. These problems are vast and 
complex in nature, although in essence they revolve around the issues of debt, a 
rapidly growing population and land scarcity. All are of such a proportion that they 
serve to divert considerable funds from a host of competing causes requiring 
substantial capital input, in addition to determining the size, structure and direction 
of the economy and the pace and extent of its development. 
Egypt possesses a wide range of assets which set her apart from many other countries 
in the region. The size of her population and standards of education have made her 
the greatest source of skilled and educated manpower within the Arab world. In 
addition to securing her an unrivalled cultural role within the region, this has been of 
enormous tangible and economic benefit, a vast volume of remittances having been 
regularly sent home by expatriate Egyptians, employed in the Gulf, Iraq and Libya. 
Although the remittances have amounted to one of the greatest sources of foreign 
exchange for Egypt, fears have nevertheless been expressed about the brain-drain 
resulting from a significant portion of the skilled and educated workforce being 
abroad. 
Abd al-Nasser's programme of heavy industrialisation and the legacy of the industrial 
tradition that precedes it exceeds what is to be found in any other state in the region. 
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Intervention and protectionism have frequently been employed excessively and 
unrealistically to aid the sector. However, the sector's very presence has contributed 
to Egypt's economic diversification, and as such is something considered beneficial. 
In recent decades, the dominant role of the agricultural sector has been challenged 
and superseded by industry. However, given the fertility of the soil, the ready 
supplies of water and the ever present and demanding domestic and foreign markets, 
the sector continues to be a major employer and source of national income. During 
Abd al-Nasser's era it was one of the few areas of economic activity not under direct 
government control or ownership, although so complex was, and is, the 
government's system of subsidies, price controls and taxes, many feel the sector's 
full potential is yet to be realised. A loosening of government control in recent 
decades has resulted in diversification within the sector, a change from certain 
traditional crops and a rewarding insight into possibilities for the future. 
Earnings from the Suez Canal, tourism and the oil industry have been very 
substantial in recent decades, however, as is the case with so many other economic 
concerns in Egypt, the maximum utilisation of revenue and the long term prospects 
for development are severely hampered and under extreme pressure. This pressure is 
largely attributable to a population growth rate estimated currently to be 3% per 
annum. Should this rate continue throughout the 1990's, Egypt's population, already 
considered excessively large, will amount to seventy five million by the end of the 
decade. 
The phenomenon of urbanisation, not unique to Egypt but common throughout the 
developing world, has compounded social and economic problems in areas of the 
country far from naturally conducive to population increase and change. The 
provision of extra housing, education and employment opportunities in already 
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crowded towns and cities burdens the existing infrastructure in addition to distorting 
wages and the cost of living. 
Abd al-Nasser's successors live with the legacy of his employment guarantee to 
every graduate - a vast and inefficient body of civil servants, an estimated one third 
of whom could be made redundant without there being any substantial or significant 
change in output. 
A system of consumer good subsidies, implemented to ensure a fair distribution of 
income but never administered in the most effective or efficient of manners is one of 
the means by which the government has attempted to redress some of the social and 
economic imbalances of recent decades. With an annual cost of £4 billion, the 
government is under considerable pressure to reform this system, and indeed that of 
its debt problem as a whole. However, popular political pressure has ensured that 
government's response has only been hesitant and underscored with caution. 
Confronted with problems at the popular, political and economic levels, Egypt's 
planners are faced with the task of implementing investment programmes throughout 
every sector of the economy, of mobilising, allocating and ensuring the effective 
utilisation and distribution of scarce resources, and of fostering an environment 
conducive to economic growth and development. 
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1.2 The Contribution of Fmance 
If we are to acknowledge that two key elements of economic growth and 
development are saving and investment, it would appear that there is a role within 
the developmental process to be played by the financial sector. To examine this role 
more fully, it is worth exploring these key terms, and indeed the term 'financial 
sector" itself. 
A financial intermediary, a single component of a financial sector, can be said to 
undertake the basic task of bringing together savers and investors. As a part of this 
process, the well functioning intermediary will bring about a productive and efficient 
allocation of money, encourage saving, and contribute ultimately to a tempering of 
the economic climate. 
The execution of these functions is essentially dependant upon the saver and his 
willingness and ability to save and invest. The saver's ability to save relates directly 
to his willingness and ability to avoid total consumption of his income, and his 
willingness to invest to the terms and returns on the potential investment. To 
maximise the returns and achieve the best possible results requires a degree of 
specialisation, and the saver is not necessarily the most efficient of investors. 
By the same token, the entrepreneur requiring capital to finance a project, is not 
necessarily the best suited of individuals to finding a source of finance on terms 
agreeable to both himself and the provider. This task also requires a degree of 
specialisation. 
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As has been suggested, these specialist roles can be undertaken by a financial 
intermediary. The greater the degree of specialisation within a financial sector, the 
greater the specialist's and the sector's potential contribution to promoting economic 
growth and development. The political, social and economic environment in which a 
financial sector is required to operate is among the factors which determines the 
degree of efficiency and success of the sector, something enjoyed ultimately the 
customer. However, reconciling a financier's aspirations with those of a government 
can be complex and at times a conflicting process. 
A well functioning financial sector has the potential to augment quantities of real 
savings and capital formation; to facilitate and possibly even encourage capital inflow 
from abroad; and to raise the productivity of investment by improving investment 
allocation. Such roles are important enough in any country but in a state where the 
economic climate is not necessarily naturally conducive to growth and development, 
these roles are clearly crucial. 
1.3 The Statement of Inquiry 
This thesis essentially amounts to an investigation of the financial sector in Egypt up 
until the late 1980's. The manner in which the sector has developed is examined, 
along with the manner in which it has responded to and been adapted to the country's 
changing economic circumstances and political outlook. The sector today is 
examined in the light of the social, political and economic environment in which it is 
required to operate, and an attempt is made to ascertain how well equipped it is to 
contribute to the resolution of some of the problems currently burdening the country. 
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To achieve this end, I examine initially some of the theories relating to finance and 
development, and more particularly, the path of development charted frequendy by 
financial sectors in the developing world. An 'ideal' role for the financial sector and 
its various components is considered alongside the reality that so often exists; and the 
manner in which the sector can be subject to intervention, alongside the impact 
which intervention can have on the manner in which the sector functions. 
In the third chapter, the changing structure of the Egyptian financial sector is 
considered in the light of historical and economic change. This enables us to 
appreciate why it is shaped and structured as it is today. In the chapter dealing with 
the activities of the sector today, the regulatory environment in which the sector and 
its institutions are required to operate is considered. In addition, the activities of the 
sector, according to a variety of different institutional categories - banks, insurance 
companies and the stock exchange are examined. 
The penultimate chapter details some of the broader issues relating to financial 
development in Egypt and attempts to identify some of the major shortcomings of the 
sector today. Confidence, at the domestic, political and international levels is 
considered along with some of the attitudes prevailing in Egypt today. The 
information which forms the basis of this section was largely obtained through 
interviews and discussions conducted in Cairo, along with the findings of a variety of 
reports and general observations. 
The final section, which takes the form of the conclusion, brings together the main 
ideas of the thesis in an attempt to satisfy and answer the statement of inquiry posed 
earlier in this chapter. 
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Chapter 2 Finance and Development 
Recognition of the importance of a financial sector in contributing to the growth and 
development of an economy appears evident i f we acknowledge that the most basic 
functions of the sector are the mobilisation and utilisation of savings, and that 
economic growth is dependent on savings. These, however, are specialist functions 
and the factors which determine how successfully they are pursued are complex and 
varied, relating to the component parts of a financial sector, whether they be the 
institutions or their customers, and that of the general political, economic and social 
climate in which the entire process operates. 
The underlying aim of this chapter is to outline the potential of a financial sector to 
aid economic growth and development, and consider alongside this the broad 
historical pattern of sectoral development in the developing world. This approach 
enables us to identify why the sector's contribution is not always to maximum effect, 
reasons for this and some of the areas of reform governments in the developing 
world and elsewhere are being urged to undertake to rectify the situation. 
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2.1 Financial Systems and Development 
A financial system at its most basic level contributes to economic growth and 
development through the provision of a medium of exchange, ^ that is to say 
removing the necessity of the 'mutual coincidence of wantscharacteristic of a 
barter economy. Acting as an intermediary, a financial system brings together 
potential savers and investors, performing the specialist functions of search, 
discrimination and allocation. 
Finance, or credit, can take two different forms, direct and indirect.^ Direct finance 
is the term used to describe the transfer of capital directly from a saver to a spender, 
a process dependant on the saver's willingness and ability to save and invest. His 
ability to save relates directly to his willingness and ability to avoid the total 
consumption of his income; and his willingness to invest to the terms of, and the 
returns on the potential investment. To maximise the returns and achieve the most 
suitable terms requires a degree of specialisation, and there is every possibility that 
the saver will lack either the inclination, or the ability and expertise to go about this 
fruitfully. The saver is not necessarily the most efficient of investors. 
On a similar basis, it is conceivable that the potential investor, requiring capital to 
make practical an entrepreneurial idea, lacks the inclination, expertise or ability to 
find a saver looking for a mutually appealing financial transaction. 
1 Von Pischke, J D et al Eds, Rural Development of Financial Markets (Baltimore & London: 
The John Hopkins University Press 1983) p 26 
2 World Development Report 1989 published for the World Bank (Oxford: OUP 1989) p 26 
3 Von Pischke, J D p 50 
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Indirect finance is the term used to describe the transfer of capital from a saver to a 
spender by means of a financial intermediary. As is the case with direct finance, 
indirect finance is dependant on the saver's willingness and ability to save and invest. 
However, i f possessing a degree of expertise, the intermediary can possibly ensure a 
more effective and efficient allocation of capital than that achieved through 
'coincidence', something of benefit ultimately to both saver and investor. 
The greater the degree of specialisation within a financial sector and the range of 
options or types of finance available to potential savers and investors, the greater the 
appeal in saving, and ultimately the prospects and possibilities of economic growth."^  
The very presence of a financial institution, operating successfully and under 
favourable conditions, is such that people might be encouraged by the potential yield 
on savings to set aside a portion of their income. The absence of an institution might 
only prompt such action if an investment opportunity is directly at hand. 
It has been suggested that a financial intermediary, as a specialised institution, has a 
greater chance of ensuring a more effective and efficient use of capital than that 
achieved through 'coincidence'. Nevertheless, there is always a certain degree of 
risk associated with any transaction, no matter how specialised the intermediary. 
The returns on and the terms of certain investments are less guaranteeable than 
others. A financial system can reduce such risk, however, either through avoiding 
risky areas of economic activity altogether, or by demanding greater compensation, 
in the form of higher prices and profits to compensate for the higher risk.^ 
4 Goldsmith, R W Financial Structure and Development (New Haven, Conn: Yale University 
Press 1969) p 27 
5 VonPischkeJD p 27 
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Through the management of risk, the reduction of the need for 'co-incidence' and the 
employment of specialist skills, finance can pervade all areas of economic life. 
Given this, and the fact that the control and management of finance can contribute 
greatly to determining national levels of immediate and long-term consumption, a 
financial sector is greatly prone to government intervention. The form that this takes 
and its effects are detailed later in the chapter, more immediately, however, it is 
worth considering the main sources of saving. This section acts as a prelude to 
tracing the growth of financial sectors within developed countries, those states which 
are defined as having, amongst other things, low levels of domestic saving.^  
2.2 Saving and Development 
It would appear evident, from what has already been said, that a scarcity of capital is 
a fundamental obstacle to economic development. Within the developing world, 
wages are low and so, consequently, are savings. As suggested, the availability of 
savings determines the availability of resources for investment. 
Sources of saving can be categorised broadly as foreign and domestic, public and 
private.'^  Foreign savings, used as investment capital, can take the form of loans or 
grants and might come from a public agency, government or the private sector. Due 
to the low levels of domestic saving in developing countries, this has historically 
been a popular and common source of capital, the nature of cultural and political 
relationships between donors and recipients often determining the nature of the 
^ Selim, H M Financial Structure & the Role of the Financial Institutions in the Economy of the 
UAR (Egypt): An Evaluation & Policy Implications (Phd Thesis University of Colorado 
1969) p 12 
"7 Selim, H M p 14 
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transfer of capital, whether as a loan or a grant, and the manner and time scale over 
which repayment is made. The transfer of capital can be made on a purely 
commercial basis. 
Domestic saving can come from the public sector in the form of a budget surplus, 
from the private sector, or by means of the implementation of various monetary 
devices, such as inflation or credit control. A budget surplus amounts to a financial 
unit's income being in excess of its expenditure. Where that financial unit is a 
government, one of its sources of income is taxation. However, the use of taxation 
as a means of generating surplus income is somewhat restricted. There are levels 
beyond which taxation is not socially acceptable or tolerable, and sometimes 
problems relating to its administration and collection. The use of inflation, credit 
expansion and other monetary devices, such as forced saving, are partly dependant 
on the sophistication of the county's financial sector and economic infrastructure. At 
the same time the risk of mismanagement is great, something potentially damaging to 
the economy. 
Private savings include enterprises' accumulated reserves out of previous profits; 
those of household units consist of savings held in financial institutions, invested in 
securities or possibly lent privately in the form of a direct transaction. 
Household units represent a most significant source of saving.^ A survey conducted 
in Asian countries revealed that one half to two thirds of gross saving was done by 
such units, however, much of the saving was held in a form inappropriate for direct 
investment.^ One of the functions of a financial system is to exploit and realise the 
8 Drake, P J Money. Finance & Development (Oxford: Martin Robertson 1980) p 123 
9 Von Pischke, J D p 52 
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potential of this category of saving, converting it to a form appropriate for 
investment. 
The nature of 'non-institutional' or 'traditional' savings is governed by factors 
concerning both the saver himself and his economic circumstances. These include 
the size and regularity of his income, the form of his income and his earning status. 
Within a developing country traditional savings are generally found to a greater 
degree in rural areas where they might take the form of land holdings, land 
improvements or simple agricultural tools. Livestock, inventories of foodstuffs, and 
precious metals and stones are also common, and such non-institutional savings are 
by no means restricted to rural areas. 
As is the case with institutional savings, traditional savings are held on account of 
their relative liquidity, their divisibility and sometimes because they offer a degree of 
protection and stability against inflation. This is the case with foodstuffs although 
the disadvantage relating to them concerns the costs of storage and the risk of 
spoilage. Metals and stones have traditionally been held on account of their high 
value in relation to their size, their universal wealth and because they are both 
familiar and trusted. One of the important and notable features of traditional savings 
is that they are generally under the direct control of their owners. This possibly 
explains a hesitancy and reluctance by some to invest in institutional savings. 
In order to bring about change in the nature of savings, from that of an unproductive 
to a productive form, a financial institution must be able to offer an alternative with 
high appeal and qualities greater than those attached to the traditional savings, In 
addition to offering better liquidity, divisibility and security there must be a means of 
10 Drake, P J p 123 
11 Drake, P J p 38 
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ensuring the productivity of the savings. This is achieved through the process of the 
financial institution channelling the savings, in the form of loans, to entrepreneurs 
and those requiring capital for investment. I f not done, there will be no productivity 
or yield following the conversion of the savings and their contribution to financial 
and economic development will have ultimately been of little benefit. 
In many parts of the developing world the 'tapping' of traditional stores of wealth 
and their conversion to productive, commercial forms is of relatively recent origin. 
This has been due to both the nature and appeal of traditional banking practice, and 
at the same time the form of institutional banking in existence. 
Barter economies, those in which a rudimentary or 'traditional' banking system 
might be found, are highly restrictive of economic growth and development when 
considered in the light of more fully developed monetised systems. Such traditional 
systems, when considered within their own self defined bounds can, however, be 
functionally adequate to the extent of satisfying immediate, perceived and desired 
needs. 12 
The movement of a barter system towards that of a monetary system creates a 
situation where an individual or institution is required to undertake the role of the 
'intermediary' in transactions, facilitating the movement, and a better use of 
capital. 13 An intermediary is required in the event of payments and receipts not 
being bridged immediately and the consequent and inevitable hoarding of assets by 
some individuals. The intermediary adopts the role of a centralised deposit facility, 
reducing the need for individual hoarding and as a result, the costs associated with 
12 World Development Report 1989 p 26 
13 Wilson, R Banking & Finance in the Arab Middle East (London: Macmillan Publishers Ltd 
1983) pp 1-2 
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ensuring the security of the hoarded asset. An extension of this function allows the 
intermediary to offer a service, by ensuring that the deficit resulting from a delay 
between payment and receipt is bridged. 
The assets employed in a barter economy can be held in many different forms, and as 
such, a movement to a monetary system creates the need for some form of exchange 
system to be developed. This function, alongside the above mentioned ones, is 
normally undertaken by a money lender or money changer. 
Whilst a system revolving around the activities of money lenders and changers can 
assume complex and sophisticated proportions, there are associated drawbacks. 
Customer - client relations are often based on ties of a religious, cultural or familial 
nature and as a result can be exclusive of certain groups requiring capital, or aspiring 
to its acquisition. Through the money lender or money changer's willingness to deal 
in traditional monies and savings in a variety of forms, the wholesale adoption of 
'institutionalisation' is not seen as a necessary path to pursue, thus ensuring that only 
a portion of savings remain tapped. 
Monetisation, and the adoption of 'institutional finance', is by no means a perfect 
system either. Along with other systems of finance, it shares a susceptibility to faults 
and flaws which can perpetuate exclusiveness, make it subject to intervention and 
thus impede the process of economic growth and development. 
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2.3 Foreign Commercial Banks in the Developing World 
During the period of the West's colonial expansion, foreign commercial banks were 
generally the only institutionalised forms of financial institution in existence within 
what we now know as the developing world. Local financial practices generally 
centred on the activities of money lenders and changers, or alternatively took the 
form of barter systems. The foreign banks were often based in ports or centres of 
agricultural or industrial production, their activities revolved largely around trade, 
occasionally production. 14 
With their head offices based overseas, these banks were, and indeed acted, as mere 
branches, allied to a system which failed to take account of local interests. Bank 
policy was directed from abroad, savings channelled home, and strict home country 
credit standards applied to potential customers. The severe nature of these standards 
had the effect of ensuring that most customers were of expatriate origin and that the 
natives were almost automatically and totally excluded from banking and financial 
activity. This served to restrict the growth towards monetisation through denying 
the natural spread of the banking habit. At the same time, the effect of economic 
growth and development, with its knock-on potential, was limited as a result of the 
bankers' reluctance to engage in activities other than trade. 
Two systems of finance existed, one a muted and underdeveloped form of the other, 
each one largely exclusive of the other. The broad reaching benefits associated with 
finance and financial development were slight. 
14 Drake, P J p 158-160 
25 
Whilst institutional exclusivity certainly existed, financial technology did gradually 
seep out into the countries in which the banks were based. In some cases this 
resulted in the natives establishing private institutions of their own run on 'Western' 
lines. In other cases, such projects were pursued by governments with the advent of 
independence. Ambitious plans aimed at promoting social welfare and economic 
development and diversity required substantial capital input, and financial sectors 
were rightly perceived as one of the means through which the necessary capital could 
be procured, i ^ Where an adequate financial sector did not exist, many governments 
took it upon themselves to create one. Where a sector did exist, governments often 
changed operational conditions, thereby facilitating and ensuring a greater 
management of, and access to the system and its assets. 
1^  World Development Report p 54 
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2.4 State-led Approaches to Financial Development 
The process of a government or central administration electing to create a financial 
institution, or sector is known as the 'supply-lead' approach. Such a pursuit is 
normally aimed at transferring resources from traditional or non-growing sectors of 
the economy to alternative, 'would-be' growing sectors in an attempt to promote an 
entrepreneurial response. 
The opposite process is known as the 'demand-follow' approach, an advocate of 
which might argue that, '...where enterprise leads, finance will follow...' This is a 
process perceived as being devoid of, or having limited government input. 
Given finance's all pervading nature, as detailed elsewhere in this chapter, there is a 
clear temptation for the government of any country to channel financial resources 
into areas which lack resources. Whilst many would conclude that such a course was 
not necessarily a bad thing, one would find amongst others widespread recognition of 
the potentially detrimental consequences of such action. The judgement of a 
government might be subject to clouding by the pursuit of short term political gain, 
as opposed to honed and sharpened by economic reality and expertise; a government 
might be tempted to take upon itself the management of ever increasing portions of 
the economy, excluding competitors possibly through the denial of financial 
resources; a government might lack the necessary expertise to make accurate and 
appropriate judgements relating to areas of life where others might be better suited to 
manage. All such reasons, of course, pre-suppose a particular form of government. 
Such criticisms could be equally levelled at non-governmental power groups 
including financial and economic monopolies, whether publicly or privately owned. 
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Speaking generally of the developing world, the adoption of the supply-lead 
approach was generally driven by government, reflecting as much as anything else 
the under-developed, ill-equipped and disorganised nature of the private sector, and 
indeed the state of the existing institutionalised financial sector. 
The need to create a central bank to manage and regulate the sector was generally 
evident, and i f such an institution already existed, the need to reform it was also 
there. Existing financial institutions, surviving relics of colonialism, were generally 
directed from abroad, frequently from a variety of different countries. These 
institutions often dealt in an array of different currencies. Consequently, financial 
sectors frequently lacked unity, co-ordination and purpose, and governments any 
degree of control or authority over banking or financial activity - not to mention over 
economic growth or development. 
The role of a central bank encompasses a number of different areas, including 
banker to the government, the bankers' bank and lender of the last resort. Its 
overall role concerns the cultivation of active and healthy business through 
identifying the country's economic potential and encouraging enterprise and 
finance to help stimulate and realise this. In having to achieve and maintain 
financial stability it must regulate existing institutions to ensure sound financial 
practise, and administer the issue of notes and the supply, cost and availability of 
money. 
The ability of a central bank to regulate financial and economic activity is often 
impaired on account of the absence or the shallowness of existing markets and more 
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particularly the under developed nature of local bond and security markets, i ^ Such 
a situation leads to commercial banks holding reserves and instruments in external 
securities. This not only inhibits local markets but stems the effectiveness of the 
central bank in exercising the tool of bank rate policy. Likewise, the presence of 
international banks can offset attempts to work open market operations. 
A market for securities, including company shares and debentures, and government 
bonds and bills provides potential liquidity to the owners of otherwise illiquid assets. 
In fostering intermediation, such a market is seen to encourage financial 
development, and in introducing an element of competition, to improve allocation 
procedure. 
Security markets do not provide a key to rapid economic growth but can help reduce 
the monopolistic powers of other financial institutions. However, those companies 
which issue securities tend to be large, well known and long established firms, often 
of foreign ownership or control. The buyers of securities generally have a high level 
of financial sophistication and appreciation of finance beyond saving and spending. 
A securities market is seldom an early creation when 'scratch' financial development 
is undertaken, specialised institutions dealing with specific sectors of the economy 
are more likely to be established first. These might range from development banks 
to institutions supplying finance for agricultural, industrial or small business projects, 
post office saving schemes or insurance companies. Essentially, all are concerned 
with mobilising domestic saving and spreading the banking habit. 
16 Drake, P J p 173 
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The establishment of a central bank frequently led to the spawning of an array of 
other institutions to fill potential and immediate investment and finance gaps, all 
enabling the state to pursue programmes of social welfare and economic development 
and diversity. Conceived of by government, these programmes were often also 
owned, administered and financed by government. Great reliance was placed on 
financing them through domestic credit channels and heavy foreign borrowing. 
The use of foreign channels was particularly prominent during the 1970's when the 
world was awash with petro-doUars as a result of the oil boom. Western banks were 
encouraged and proved themselves enthusiastic to lend to the developing world at 
low rates of interest - even negative rates in some instances. Although the long term 
benefit and effect of these loans has been questioned of recent, they were not seen as 
a problem at the time they were received. 
Debt in itself is not a problem, providing there are means of ensuring its repayment 
in a form and at a time agreed by the lender and the borrower. However, many of 
the projects financed by these loans were of limited productive and economic benefit. 
This, coupled by the fact that the interest charged on the loans was variable resulted 
ultimately in disaster. In the late 1970's the governments of the West moved to 
clamp down on rising inflation rates through exercising strict monetary policy. This 
had the effect of forcing up the interest charged to borrowers, l 
Domestic productive capacity was not sufficient in many cases to accommodate these 
rises, necessitating the adoption of rescheduling initiatives, and in some cases it 
resulted in governments defaulting on repayment, i ^ The International Monetary 
1^  Knox, David Third World Debt - First World Responsibility a talk given at Edinburgh 
University by Mr David Knox, former Vice President of the World Bank, for the Centre for 
Theology and Public Issues, 17 November 1990 
1^  Long & Evenhouse Restructuring Distressed Financial Systems an article by Millard Long and 
Eirik Evenhouse taken from Finance & Development (September 1989) p 2 
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Fund and the World Bank, aware of the threat this posed to international economic 
stability, were prominent in attempting to contain the 'debt crisis', advocating and 
urging governments to adopt structural reform programmes and re-consider their 
stance on development, particularly the tools that had been exercised in an attempt to 
bring it about. 
Financial reform was considered imperative. In many cases individual institutions, 
in others sectors as a whole had failed to bring about an effective and efficient 
allocation of capital; poor financial performance had often resulted in mobilised 
savings being transferred overseas. The processes of reform continue to this day. 
2.5 The Consequences of Intervention 
The failure of finance often occurs as a consequence of government intervention and 
the economic climate in which institutions are required to operate. 
Within the developing world, the fact that most development schemes were enacted 
and managed through a central plan had a great bearing on the financial sector's 
performance and the scope for sectoral development. Under a system of central 
planning, contracts and transactions are made more through planning bureaux and 
less through financial markets and institutions. 'The order of the day is internal 
finance and balanced budgets, not external finance and the issue of new securities.' i ^ 
Institutions, as already suggested, were subject to intervention, something largely 
pursued by government because of a fear that the private sector, or market forces 
1^  White, Lawrence H Privatisation of the Financial Sector (Washington DC: AID International 
Conference on Privatisation 1986) p 6 
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could deny finance and expertise to government favoured areas of the economy. The 
risk associated with such favoured areas often deterred financial sector involvement, 
in some cases despite the areas having the potential to serve well the country's long 
term economic interests. Trade finance, for instance, is a far less risky business than 
the provision of finance for agriculture, it requires a lesser degree of specialisation 
and by its nature it is short term.^ o 
A variety of forms of intervention exist, from the extremes of direct ownership and 
the appropriation of institutions, to the more commonly practised 'directed credit' 
approach. This is a system whereby financial institutions are forced by government 
to lend to state enterprises and priority economic sectors at below-market interest 
rates, despite the fact that they may not be the most productive of investments. Paid 
for through cross-subsidisation, whereby higher rates are charged to some borrowers 
and lower rates paid to some lenders, bank profits are reduced and the danger exists 
that the categories of borrowers discriminated against will seek finance on the 
informal, more expensive credit markets. 
To ascertain the effects of directed credit is nigh impossible as it is necessary to ask 
whether the recipients use their resources more productively than those denied the 
credit. It is clear, however, that the provision of cheap credit often encourages less 
productive investment, thus increasing the possibility of non-payment of loans. 
Where loans are not repaid, there is a danger of lending institutions becoming 
insolvent, even failing, although politically this is often not permitted to happen.21 
Although a government might attempt to stimulate a flow of resources into, or away 
from particular sectors of the economy through adjusting interest rates, there is no 
20 Knox, David 
21 White, Lawrence H p 13 
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assurance that this will in fact be effective. I f such 'favoured areas' are perceived as 
too risky, they may be altogether avoided, even i f there are short term tangible 
incentives. Governments have frequently attempted to divert funds from trade 
finance in an effort to boost other sectors, to reduce the volume of imports by 
increasing the interest charged to those desiring trade finance. The cost of an 
additional service charge, however, is all too easily passed on to the customer, 
defeating - at a blow - the government's intentions. 
An inflationary environment is something that severely hampers the prospects of 
financial development and optimal financial performance. As was mentioned earlier, 
during the 1970's there was a great dependence on foreign borrowing to finance both 
public sector deficits and supply capital for domestic government projects. By the 
1980's, this source of capital had largely dried up and governments were forced to 
consider domestic sources. Domestic financial markets being too shallow, the 
central banks were required to print themselves out of the crisis, inevitably forcing 
up the rate of inflation. Financial institutions were frequently forced to buy low 
yield government bonds and through 'reserve requirements' make available loans at 
below-market rates. Faced with such a situation, institutions were put in the position 
of either reducing profits, or passing on the costs to customers by charging high 
lending rates and offering low deposit rates. Under such circumstances, the 
combination of high inflation and low deposit rates can result in capital flight and a 
reduction in the volume of capital available for lending.22 
22 Selim, H M p 26 
33 
The governments of many countries have been urged in recent years to review their 
interventionist approach to the financial sector and undertake broad reaching 
programmes of reform. For most, the urgency with which this must be done stems 
not least from the fact that foreign sources of capital are no longer as plentiful as in 
the past, and consequently a greater reliance must be placed on domestic savings and 
home grown enterprise. The impact of popular opinion and heightened individual 
and collective expectation has also forced a change of course by certain governments. 
Ideologically, these reforms can involve a fairly major change for some 
governments. 'Country experience has shown that a reduction or removal of control 
promotes growth, both in the financial system and the economy, but it must be 
accompanied by a loss of power some governments would like to exercise over the 
changing shape of their economies.'^ ^ 
Reforms are not only required to be directed at the loosening of government control 
on interest rates, directed credit programmes and exchange rates but at legal and 
accounting procedures and in some cases the ownership of the financial sector. The 
availability of information concerning the sector's activities is often considered 
wholly inadequate, as is the state's willingness to admit that certain institutions might 
be insolvent. 
It would not be a generalisation to suggest that the governments of many developing 
countries have been urged to adopt a change of attitude and outlook in order to create 
'...a policy environment in which finance can become less a tool for implementing 
23 VonPischke, J D p 28 
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development strategies and more a voluntary process for mobilising and allocating 
savings.' 24 
24 Long & Evenhouse p 7 
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Chapter 3 Economic and Financial Development in Egypt 
The aim of this chapter is to make apparent some of the economic issues in Egypt 
which have had a bearing on the development of the Egyptian financial sector, its 
performance and the extent to which it has been able to contribute to economic 
development. 
3.1 The Origins of Financial Development 
The history of modem finance in Egypt, and indeed the Middle East as a whole 
dates to the reign of the Egyptian ruler, Muhammad Ali (1805 - 1848).25 Although 
his period of rule was characterised by marked economic activity and the 
establishment and growth of an industrial sector, there was, unusually, little 
corresponding financial development at the domestic level. 
Such was the monopolistic manner in which Muhammad Ali controlled the economy, 
market relations were constrained and the need for money reduced.26 This, in 
effect, served to perpetuate existing financial practices - those that centred largely 
upon the activities of money lenders and money changers who dealt in a variety of 
different currencies. In 1834 an attempt to establish a single Egyptian currency 
failed, and it was only fifty years later that Egypt's monetary system took a more 
structured form, when it was aligned with the United Kingdom's.27 
25 Wilson, R Banking & Finance in the Arab Middle East (London: Macmillan Publishers Ltd 
1983) p 19 
26 Mansour, Fawsy Development of the Egyptian Financial System up to 1967 (Cairo: Ain 
Shams University Press 1970) pp 6-7 
27 Mansour, Fawsy p 8 
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On the international level, growing trade links with Europe proved to be a significant 
stimulus to the development of foreign financial institutions. This integration was 
compounded by the opening of the Suez Canal, the growth of cotton exports and the 
increase in foreign debts amassed by Muhammad All's extravagant heirs (an 
estimated £91 million by 1876). Between 1858, when the Egyptian bank was 
established, and the appearance of the Banque Misr in 1920, over a dozen financial 
institutions came into being. Table 3.1 details the ownership of the main institutions 
and their locations, the majority being of foreign origin and based in the capital, 
Cairo. 
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Table 3.1 The main commercial banks in operation 1856 - 1920 















The Egyptian Bank Cairo 
The Anglo-Egyptian Bank Cairo 
The Ottoman Bank Alexandria 
The Yokohama 
The Ottoman Bank 
Cassa di Sconto e di 
Risparimo 
The Ottoman Bank 
Bank d'Athenes 
The National Bank of 
Egypt 
The Agricultural Bank 
The Banque Misr 
Cairo 
Port Said 
The Credit Lyonnais Port Said 
Credit Foncier Egyptien Cairo 

























owned by NBE 
Egyptian 
Source: Compiled from Wilson, R Banking and Finance in the Arab Middle East 
(London: Macmillan Publishers Ltd, 1983) pp 19-29 
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Diverse though the nationalities of the owners might have been, the financial 
activities pursued by the various institutions were essentially not. Most were 
concerned with commercial activities, the cotton industry and the finance of trade, 
whilst their customers frequently shared a common national or ethnic identity. Of all 
the institutions mentioned in the table, it will be noted that the only one owned by 
Egyptians was the Banque Misr. Even the National Bank of Egypt was in the hands 
of the British. 
The exclusive nature of these foreign commercial banks and their inaccessibility to 
all but a select number of Egyptians provoked a general desire for a bank owned and 
staffed by Egyptians, serving Egyptian interests.28 in 1920 well over one hundred 
Egyptians subscribed £E 80,000 towards the establishment of the Banque Misr. The 
institution proved to be most popular, its appeal stemming, not least, from its all 
Egyptian board of directors. Many of the customers used it merely as a savings 
bank, depositing small sums which might well have been directly consumed in the 
absence of a similarly appealing institution. In its intention to promote industry and 
find a non-agricultural outlet for investment, the bank was forthright. Its interests 
ranged from shipping, weaving and insurance, to a cinema chain and agriculture, a 
total of twenty seven different industrial and commercial concerns. 
Similarly active were the stock exchanges of Cairo and Alexandria, each established 
in the latter decades of the nineteenth century. By 1906, the British established stock 
exchange of Cairo was trading 328 joint stock companies with a total capital value of 
£ 91 million, and the exchange in Alexandria was ranked sixth in the world. 
28 Wilson, R pp 28-31 
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'Import substitution industrialisation'29 was the characteristic of the Egyptian 
economy between the 1920's and the 1950's, a state brought about by a variety of 
domestic and international factors. Agricultural crises in the 1920's and 1930's, 
which culminated in the great depression, revealed to the Egyptians the enormous 
dangers of dependence on cotton, motivating a search for alternatives. 
With cotton's decline, industry emerged, prompted by the Banque Misr. This helped 
to contribute to the country's economic diversification. Under a regime of tariffs 
imposed by the government, there was scope for industry to flourish; under the 
conditions imposed by the World War I I the process was considerably boosted. The 
disruption of international trade caused by the war served as a 'super-tariff, whilst 
the presence of Allied troops ensured a ready market for Egyptian produce. 
It was amid this environment of growing national self-reliance and self-esteem, that 
Gamal Abd al-Nasser grew up. His actions in 1952 and thereafter were to have a 
considerable impact on Egypt and the region during his own lifetime and well 
beyond his death. The events of 1952, popularly known as the Egyptian Revolution, 
brought to power the Free Officers. This group was to oversee the ending of the 
monarchy and the removal of the British from Egyptian soil and, of even greater 
significance, the ushering in of a new economic era, rooted in a bedrock of 
nationalised industry and guided by a central plan. 
29 Hopwood, Derek Egypt: Politics & Society 1945-1984 (London: Allen & Unwin 1985) 
p l 7 
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3.2 The Policies of Nationalisation and Central Planning 
The structure of the financial sector in the 1950's broadly echoed that of the first half 
of the century, that is to say there was a predominance of foreign owned institutions 
and a considerable concentration of capital in a few institutions. Only the Banque 
Misr and a portion of shares in the National Bank of Egypt were in Egyptian hands, 
and of the twenty four commercial banks in existence, a quarter of them, including 
the Banque Misr, held 78% of all advances and 85% of all deposits. 
The Free Officers on their rise to power in 1952 appeared quite content to maintain 
foreign and private participation throughout the economy. They even encouraged it. 
Laws were passed in 1953 and 1954 which not only provided tax incentives for 
private investors but permitted a majority foreign holding in Egyptian companies. 
For much of the 1950's, economic policy was also pursued in broadly the same 
manner as it had been prior to the revolution.31 Saving and investment ratios 
remained relatively stable; public investment was financed through the institution 
acting as the central bank (the National Bank of Egypt); and the balance of payments 
was financed by running down foreign exchange reserves, worth approximately £425 
million, accumulated during World War 11.^ 2 
Such a balance was not to be maintained, as in 1952 the government introduced 
important legislation concerning the reform of the agricultural sector which had a 
knock-on effect elsewhere in the economy. The reforms, further developed in 1961, 
30 Wilson, R p 52-53 
31 Mabro, Robert The Egyptian Economy 1952-1972 (Oxford: Claredon Press 1974) 
pp 182- 183 
32 Waterbury, John The Egypt of Nasser & Sadat. The Political Economy of Two Regimes 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1983) p 61 
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were primarily aimed at redressing the balance of ownership and the size of 
agriculture holdings through limiting ownership to two hundred, and ultimately one 
hundred feddans per person. It has been suggested that underlying the reforms was a 
desire to remove the power base of potential political opponents of the new regime, 
and at the same time encourage the landed elite to invest in the industrial sector. In 
effect, the government was looking to forcibly channel savings and investment to the 
industrial sector by reducing the scope for agricultural investment. This was one of a 
variety of means to be used by the government in the mobilisation and allocation of 
finance. Others included adopting fiscal and pricing policies; tapping foreign 
borrowing; and most dramatically sequestrating and nationalising foreign and 
privately held economic assets. 
The Industrial Plan of 1957 suggested that the government planned to rely heavily on 
the private sector for investment, 79% of the total of £ 114 million expected to come 
from that source. Yet, at the same time the state was gradually securing the control 
of some fairly significant economic levers which would have an inevitable impact on 
both the economy's development as a whole and the role of the private sector. 
Compulsory membership of agricultural co-operatives had been introduced alongside 
the land reform acts. Through these, the government was able to impose price 
controls and production quotas, in addition to purchasing crops at artificially low 
prices and selling them at inflated rates on the international market. 
A more direct form of intervention was evidenced in the wake of the Suez Crisis 
with the nationalisation of the Canal and sequestration of British and French assets 
held in Egypt. The 'Economic Organisation' was created to control these newly 
acquired assets, and indeed, all public and mixed enterprises. By the end of 1958 
33 Waterbury, John p 66 
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these were valued at almost £E 60 million. Within two years the sixty four 
companies under the control of the Economic Organisation were valued at £E 80 
million and employed some 80,000 persons.34 
In 1957, the tabling of three laws (22, 23 and 24) had a great impact on the financial 
sector and added to the process of consolidating the government's hold on the 
economy.35 Foremost was legislation requiring all foreign owned banks, insurance 
companies and commercial agencies for foreign trade to become 'Egyptianised' in 
terms of management and capital within five years. 
The availability of liquidity within the Egyptian private sector was not sufficient to 
acquire the stock of all these institutions, and as a result, six banks were merged with 
existing banks and a further eight were simply liquidated. Some two hundred foreign 
owned insurance companies were purchased by three newly opened Egyptian 
companies. Of the sequestrated banks, Barclays became the Bank of Alexandria, the 
British owned Ionian and Ottoman Banks were taken over by the Bank al-
Goumhouriya, and two French banks were absorbed by the Bank of Cairo.36 The 
government's purchase of the foreign held shares of the National Bank of Egypt was 
of note, not least because of this institution's role of the Central Bank. 
In 1960, the National Bank of Egypt was divested of the powers to issue currency 
and control the volume and direction of credit in favour of the newly created and 
state owned Central Bank of Egypt. The former bank's shares were nationalised, 
3"* Storey, Christopher Middle East Currency Reports. Supplement to International Currency 
Review Volume 10 Number 1 (London: Christopher Storey [Author & Publisher] 1987) 
p l 9 
35 Kerr, David W International Conference on Capital Market Development (Cairo: USAID 1983) 
p l 2 
36 Storey, Christopher p 19 
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and by the end of 1960, in the wake of a further programme of nationalisation, the 
government had assumed control of 100% of the stock of the Bank of Alexandria, 
the Banque Misr and the Bank of Port Said; almost 50% of the stock of the Bank of 
Cairo; and a quarter of the stock of the Bank al-Goumhouriya and the Commercial 
Union Bank. The following year, all remaining financial stock was nationalised, the 
institutions' shares converted to fifteen year government bonds with an interest rate 
of 4%. Through the nationalisation of the Banque Misr, with a deposit base of 
£E100 million, the government also secured control of twenty seven commercial 
enterprises with paid up capital of £E 20 million, and a monopoly on the cotton and 
textile trades. 
The establishment of the Public Organisation for Banks, a body which largely 
assumed the role of the Economic Organisation, heralded a period of consolidation 
and absorption within the financial sector and by 1964, the sector's reform was 
largely complete. In addition to the Central Bank of Egypt, there existed five 
commercial banks, four mortgage banks and a number of industrial banks. Each of 
the commercial banks was assigned a specific area of economic activity with which 
to conduct business. Table 3.2 details the areas and hints at the somewhat complex 
and burdensome nature of the system. 
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Table 3.2 Designated areas of specialisation for Public Sector Banks 
The National Bank of Egvpt: Companies attached to the following Ministries 
and Authorities:- Agriculture, Agrarian Reform, 
Land Reclamation, Communications, Transport, 
Electricity, War, Local Government, Suez 
Canal, Railways, War Factories, Aeroplane 
Factories. 
The Banque Misr: All companies operating in the field of textiles. 
The Bank of Alexandria: Companies dealing in mining, engineering, oil 
and chemical industries, food and construction 
industries, metallurgy and co-operative 
production. 
The Bank of Cairo: Companies concerned with foreign trade, 
contracting and housing, tourism, culture and 
information. 
The Bank of Port Said: Companies attached to the following Ministries:-
Health, Supply and Internal Trade, Insurance 
and Water Wealth. 
Source: Mansour, Fawsy Development of the Egyptian Financial System up to 
1967 
(Cairo: Ain Shams University Press, 1970) p 35 
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Nationalisation was by no means restricted to the financial sector but was part of a 
wider programme whereby the government transferred to public ownership shares 
and physical assets with a value of £ E 700 million, and a probable market value of 
£E 2 billion.37 Virtually every sector fell into the state's domain, whether in terms 
of direct ownership, or control. The government made no attempt to close the stock 
market. Nevertheless, given the economic climate in which it was required to 
operate, one characterised by state ownership and central planning, activity at the 
two exchanges inevitably declined. Between 1962 and 1963 the market value of 
bond and share trading at the Cairo exchange fell from £E 12.2 million to £E5.1 
million, and for the remainder of the decade the value averaged annually £E 4.45 
million. 38 
The reasons for the government implementing this process of nationalisation are 
various, however, it was clearly of great political convenience for the state to control 
such a significant part of the economy, given that it had launched a five year plan for 
economic development in 1960. Total investment throughout the period of the plan 
was to amount to £E 1.6 billion, one third of which was to be procured through 
foreign borrowing. Within the domestic field, the private sector's contribution was 
to total 55%. This, it has been suggested, was not an expression of the state's 
confidence in the private sector but a deliberate ploy to overburden its investment 
capabilities and hence, provide a rationale for the government to exercise its policies 
of nationalisation. Against this argument, it has been suggested that nationalisation 
was needed to counter the actions of a private sector, '...bent on bending the plan, 
and with it the state, to its own purposes and inclinations'.3^ 
37 Waterbury, John pp 72-75 
38 Kerr, David W p 17 
39 Mansour, Fawsy p 33 
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The five year plan was ambitiously launched with the intention of doubling national 
income within a decade, expanding employment opportunities and ensuring a greater 
equality of opportunity.This necessitated raising the investment ratio by six or 
seven per centage points'*^ and achieving an annual growth rate of just over 7%. The 
£E 646 million worth of foreign exchange required to help finance the plan was to be 
covered by commercial debt, grants, export proceeds and invisible receipts.^ 2 
Rapid industrialisation was one of the key features of the plan, although irrigation 
and land reclamation projects and the on-going construction of the High Dam 
justified the agriculture sector's absorption of a quarter of total investment. The 
construction of such high prestige projects as the Helwan Works explains the 37% of 
total investment directed towards the industrial sector. By 1965, industrial output 
was expected to have risen by 97%, and agricultural output by 28%. 
Table 3.3 reveals that by 1963/64 gross investment and consumption had each risen 
to an all time high, as had domestic saving. Exports, on the other hand, were in 
decline, whilst imports had almost assumed the level recorded in 1952/53. During 
the latter half of the decade, public consumption continued to rise, whereas private 
consumption fell; domestic savings between 1964/65 fell markedly and indirect 
taxation rose. 
40 Zaalouk, Malak Power. Class & Canital in Egypt. The Rise of the New Bourgeoisie (London: 
Zed Books Ltd 1989) p 37 
41 Mabro, Robert pp 181-185 
42 issawi, Charles Egypt in Revolution, an Economic Analysis (Oxford: OUP 1963) pp 69-72 
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Table 3.3 Shares in GDP at market prices 1952 -1970 
(Percentages) 
(Year) '52/3 '57/8 '59/60 '63/4 '64/5 '69/70 
Gross investment 13.7 13.5 12.5 19.7 17.2 11.8 
Public consumption 16.4 16.4 16.6 21.3 19.7 24.1 
Private consumption 71.1 71.7 70.8 66.0 66.2 65.3 
Net imports 01.8 01.6 -0.1 07.0 02.5 00.4 
Domestic savings 11.9 11.9 12.6 12.7 14.7 11.3 
Indirect taxes 07.2 08.0 06.6 07.9 10.8 14.1 
Imports 28.7 21.8 20.4 26.0 21.1 13.4 
Exports 26.9 20.2 20.5 19.0 18.6 13.0 
Source: Mabro, Robert The Egyptian Economy 1952-1972 
(Oxford: Claredon Press 1974) p 177 
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Rooted in the first half of the 1960's, although increasingly evident throughout the 
entire decade was a foreign exchange crisis, the causes of which can be attributed to 
both the government's domestic policies and a variety of external factors. The crisis 
proved to be one of the root causes of the economic malaise which stretched well 
into the 1970's. During the early years of the decade, payments in excess of £E 45 
million were made to owners of sequestrated and nationalised property and the 
Sudanese government; the cost of the 40% decline in the cotton harvest of 1961 was 
an estimated £E 46 million. Alongside these short term 'one-off payments, a 
variety of other factors served to compound the balance of payments and foreign 
exchange difficulties in the longer term."^ ^ The decline in exports and the growth of 
the Egyptian population were naturally significant, as was the effect of the United 
States' Public Law 480 being revoked. This forced the government to purchase 
foodstuffs at international market rates and in an attempt to offset these costs, the 
amount of cotton planted was reduced in favour of wheat, despite cotton sales being 
a major source of foreign exchange."*^  The other great burden on the Egyptian 
economy during the 1960's was defence expenditure and the broader effects of war. 
Between 1963 and 1976, the Egyptian government was heavily involved in the civil 
war in the Yemen. Estimates for the total cost of the war vary, however, between 
1963 and 1965 defence expenditure rose from 8% to 12% of the GNP. Of even 
greater consequence was the 1967 war with Israel. At 1975 prices the estimated cost 
of the war was between £E 20 and 24 billion,'*^ and in the years following the war, 
defence expenditure averaged $ 1.61 billion. The on-going and debilitating cost of 
the war was largely due to Israel's occupation of the Sinai Peninsula. This left the 
Suez Canal closed and the immediate area economically inoperable until 1975; oil 
Mansfield, Peter Nasser's Egypt (Middlesex: Penguin Books 1965) p 184 
44 Wilson, R p 53 
45 Zaalouk, Malak p 53 
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production was reduced by half and the country's mineral reserves cut down; and a 
general fear about security caused the number of tourists visiting Egypt to decline 
sharply. 
At a time when the government had envisaged a period of financial deepening, this 
was clearly unwelcome. Growth had occurred during the period of the first plan and 
the GNP had increased at an annual rate averaging between 6% and 7%, however, 
this was largely attributable to growth in the construction and service sectors, rather 
than in agriculture and industry.'^ ^ Underlying the first plan were a number of areas 
of economic concern which, although damaging the prospects for growth and 
development, were largely ignored during the second half of the decade. These 
included policies concerning education and employment, the nature and direction of 
trade and the government's attitude towards the provision of credit for both the 
public and private sectors. 
3.3 The Role of the Financial Sector during the Nasser Era 
Under the system of central planning which characterised economic management 
during the Nasser era, the role of the financial sector was inevitably marginalised. 
The mobilisation and allocation of savings were functions undertaken by government 
bureaucracy, markets replaced by civil servants who determined the pace and 
direction of economic growth and development. As we have seen, the structure of 
the sector changed considerably over the Nasser years, from a system dominated by 
private and foreign ownership, to one of sequestration, Egyptianisation and 
ultimately nationalisation. 
46 Selim, HM p 37 
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Paramount to the government's plans was the provision of cheap credit for state 
owned enterprises, and through eliminating competition - in the form of the private 
sector - it was assumed that all savings would be channelled towards such 
concems.47 Most investment decisions were undertaken by the government, and 
these were frequently made on a political, rather than economic basis. The 
government was more concerned with dogma and its political stature than with the 
productivity and efficiency of investment. 48 
This inevitably distorted the manner in which the financial sector operated, reducing 
the scope for financial innovation and ensuring that the growth of banks was merely 
determined by the growth of the market. 
Table 3.3 revealed how domestic savings never increased beyond 14.7% and that 
during the latter half of the 1960's the government became increasingly reliant on 
indirect taxes as a means of mobilising finance. At the same time a series of laws 
had been enacted requiring joint stock companies to place 5% of their profits in 
government bonds, distribute 10% to the workforce in cash, and a further 10% to the 
community infrastructure. A minimum wage and strict working hours were also 
introduced. 49 
The nature and the direction of these measures were partly due to the regime's need 
to command the support of a broad section of the population, something echoed in 
the consumer credit policies which the banks were required to operate. These 
policies enabled a fridge, for example, to be bought with a down payment of £E 3 
47 Sayeh, H, Chairman of the Hong Kong Egyptian Bank and fonner Minister of the Economy in a 
private interview 
48 Hegazi, Abdel Aziz, former Prime Minister of Egypt in a private interview 
49 Waterbury, John p 75 
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and paid off with similar monthly instalments. Of great appeal to the new industrial 
working class, perhaps, such policies nevertheless contributed to the growth in 
consumption, and did little to ease the country's serious balance of payments 
problems. 50 
Saving was not actively encouraged, and over the years of Nasser's rule the 
importance of deposits in relation to money supply declined, a surprising trend, 
perhaps, given the increase in sophistication among middle and working class 
Egyptians and the growth in urbanisation. The gap left by the departure of foreigners 
from the Egyptian financial scene, had not, however, been filled by middle class 
Egyptians, as had been expected. A fear of their assets being confiscated and general 
government interference led many Egyptians to place their wealth overseas.^ i 
As was mentioned earlier, the government introduced a system, in the wake of 
nationalisation, whereby financial institutions were assigned specific areas of 
economic activity with which to do business. This was implemented to '...prevent 
the worst features of centralised bureaucracy...', and achieve growth and control. In 
the event, however, the lack of competition which the system engendered led to a 
great wastage of resources, and its bureaucratic and cumbersome nature meant that 
the Central Bank was unable to co-ordinate the country's foreign exchange needs.52 
Consequentiy, this system of 'sectoral allocation' was abandoned in favour of 
'functional allocation'.53 
50 Mansfield, Peter p 168 
51 Mead, & Irwin Growth & Structural Change in the Egyptian Economy (Illinois: 1967) 
p 196-197 
52 Wilson, R pp 53-56 
53 storey, Christopher p 20 
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Under this new system, the National Bank of Egypt became the focus for all foreign 
exchange operations, the Banque Misr for domestic trade, the Bank of Alexandria for 
agriculture, and the Bank of Cairo for the service sector. At the same time, the Bank 
of Port Said was merged with the Banque Misr, and the Industrial Bank with the 
Bank of Alexandria. 
The objective behind this system was to promote control and co-ordination, 
particularly with regard to the management of foreign exchange. However, the 
system is said to have been lacking in that it provided no scope for competition 
among these public sector banks; and in addition, it resulted in some institutions 
facing liquidity shortages, whilst others - generally those engaged in activities with a 
rapid turnover - such as trade, an excess of liquidity.^4 
In theory the private sector was left free to deal with any bank of its choice, 
however, the resources available to the sector were constrained as a result of public 
sector demand and in addition, ' . . . i t [the private sector] no longer had any autonomy 
and was beholden to the state for foreign exchange and controlled by the state in 
terms of allowable profits, prices, credit and supp l i e s ' .As a result, private 
investment was generally self-financed, the necessary capital coming out of income 
from privately held savings. The institutional finance available to the private sector 
came largely in the form of one year loans. Although these could be renewed and 
assume something of the status approaching term credit, such practice nevertheless 
limited the scope for long term planning and investment. 
^4 Hasan, Mahrous A The Problems of Financing Small Business in Egypt (Phd Thesis Durham 
University 1990) p 109 
55 Waterbury, John pp 76-77 
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In certain respects, Nasser's management of the economy was stunted by naivete and 
idealism. Whereas the country's economic planners had envisaged national income 
doubling over a twenty year period, the President had insisted on it being achieved in 
half the time.56 Similarly, among the reasons for domestic saving not being 
encouraged was a simple lack of appreciation of the country's investment needs; an 
over reliance on foreign aid; and an overestimate of the capital accumulation of the 
state owned enterprises.57 it is clear that a greater reliance on the financial sector 
might have alerted the government to the scale and the nature of the difficulties 
faced, but the role of the financial sector in removing and alleviating these 
difficulties could only ever have been slight when compared with the input and 
initiative required from the government itself 
56 Mansfield, Peter p 165 
57 Issawi, Charles p 272 
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3.4 The Open Door Economic Policy 
Egypt's emergence from the 1960's and the era of Nasserism was far from 
auspicious. The economy was characterised by deficit, a dependence on foreign 
loans and low levels of domestic production; investment had fallen to the same level 
as that recorded a decade before; and war and military expenditure had laid claim to 
many of the country's vital economic resources.58 it was evident that without an 
ideological change on the part of the ruling regime, or an acknowledgement that the 
prevailing system of economic management was ineffective, the chances of recovery 
from the political and economic stalemate would have been slight. 
Following the death of Nasser in 1970, his successor, Anwar Sadat, embarked on a 
process of reforming the economy through the enactment of a series of pieces of 
legislation, collectively known as the Open Door Economic Policy (ODEP). Aimed 
at binding Western technology and Arab capital to the resource base of Egypt, the 
measures required the state to loosen its grip on many facets of the economy and 
recognise the potential contribution of the private sector and foreign investors to 
stimulating growth and development. The policy was essentially concerned with 
bringing Egypt to the realities of the world market, and exposing the country to the 
international economy. 
The first piece of legislation to be introduced, following the ratification of a new 
constitution, was Law 65 of 1971.59 legalising the ODEP as a framework for the 
country's economic strategy, it guaranteed foreign investment against confiscation, 
permitted the repatriation of profits and invested capital, and provided an array of 
58 Kerr, David W p 259 
59 Zaalouk, Malak p 56 
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incentives for would-be investors. Agreements were signed on the settling of 
investment disputes, backed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, and with the Arab League on the provision of guarantees for Arab 
investments. At the same time, a basis for political realignment was established 
through the signing of repayment disputes over frozen debts owed to a variety of 
Western states. 
To encourage an inflow of foreign exchange, the government set up the Egyptian 
International Bank for Trade and Development, and in 1973 it authorised the 
establishment of a parallel market for foreign exchange, empowering the governor of 
the Central Bank to fix a US$ - E£ rate of exchange. The private sector was 
permitted to keep the proceeds of exports in foreign currency in local banks, import 
its production needs and advertise it products abroad. 
Although the economic situation continued to deteriorate during the early years of the 
decade, with total foreign debts amounting to $3.5 billion by 1973, the new measures 
did result in some 250 new projects being submitted for approval by 1974. The 
investment authority deemed 50 of them to be acceptable, 
It was not until after the 1973 war with Israel that Sadat embarked more fully on 
introducing and implementing the ODEP. Peace would eventually restore to Egypt 
the Sinai oil fields, allow the re-opening of the Suez Canal and encourage tourists 
back to the country. In 1973, however, with none of these things likely to occur 
immediately, the need was to stimulate foreign and domestic investment through 
reforming and developing existing policies and introducing new ones. 
60 Foda, A S Banking Sector Survey (Cairo: Dr A S Foda [Author and Publisher] 1982) 
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61 Waterbury, John p 130 
56 
Law 43 of 1974, later to be amended by Law 32 of 1977, served two basic purposes. 
Firstly, it established the areas of the economy available to Arab and foreign 
investment; and secondly, it provided a series of incentives and guarantees for 
potential investors, building on the legislation enacted earlier in the decade. 
Although the areas of investment encompassed virtually every sector of the economy, 
the government was particularly keen to see the development of projects with a 
capacity to generate foreign exchange and exports, and those which might result in 
the development of non-urban areas. Whether concerned with tourism, finance, 
construction or industry, most projects were to enjoy a number of different incentives 
and guarantees. The most important of these are recorded below:62 
1. Projects established would not be subject to sequestration or confiscation, other 
than through the judicial process. 
2. No matter what the distribution of capital ownership might be, a 'Law 43 project' 
would be treated as a private sector entity, and as such would not be subject to any of 
the restrictions or conditions imposed on public sector companies. 
3. Tax holidays of between five and eight years would be granted to newly 
established projects, and of between ten and fifteen years to those requiring long 
term capital input, or based in rural areas. In addition, a number of free zones were 
established for both the public and private sectors. 
Law 43 opened the door to financial innovation through allowing the establishment 
of new financial institutions which could work alongside, and would ultimately 
compete with state owned institutions, whether insurance companies, investment 
companies or banks, according to a variety of different classifications. Depending 
on the type of institution being established, various requirements had to be satisfied. 
'Business and Investment' banks were confined to foreign exchange transactions but 
62 Foda, A S p l 3 
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could be wholly foreign or privately owned, whilst those dealing in local currency 
were required to be joint ventures, the local Egyptian share being not less that 51%. 
It was not long before Barclays, American Express, Citibank, Lloyds and many other 
well known European and North American institutions opened branches or set up 
joint ventures in Egypt. Among them, the Chase Manhattan Bank of New York and 
the National Bank of Egypt subscribed, respectively, £E4.9 million and £E5.1 
million towards the creation of the Chase National Bank. The Bank of America and 
the Banque Misr entered into a similar partnership.63 
To effectively manage and regulate these new institutions, operating in an economic 
and political climate rapidly accelerating away from the one enshrined by Nasser, the 
government was required to bring in legislation to delineate the roles and functions of 
the new institutions, along with ones relating to the Central Bank. 1975 saw the 
enactment of Law 120 and the implementation of Presidential Decree number 663. 
Law 120 empowered the Central Bank and its board of directors with a degree of 
freedom unknown during the Nasser era, whether concerned with monetary, credit or 
banking policy, the promotion of economic development or the stabilising of the 
economy. The Board was permitted to establish interest rates without restriction, 
and interest on savings accounts and certificates was made exempt from income 
tax.64 In a gesture aimed at emphasising the separation between the Bank and the 
Presidential Office, the Bank's Annual Report was required to be submitted to the 
National Assembly. In the past it had gone in the first instance to the President 
himself. 
63 Storey, Christopher p 20 
64 Foda, A S p A5 
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On a practical level, Law 120 sought to free the banks of some of the burdensome 
employment legislation imposed on public entities, whilst it also allowed the import 
of computers to improve record-keeping procedures. Law 120 is said to have 
enabled the Central Bank to operate more like a banking institution than a 
government agency. 
Whilst this legislation resulted in a burgeoning of financial activity, the sector and 
most areas of the economy remained overshadowed by the four state owned 
commercial banking institutions. Since 1971 they had each been required to serve a 
specific sub-sector of the economy. Presidential Decree number 663 of 1975 sought 
to alter this, enabling the four institutions to compete freely with the newly emerging 
foreign and joint venture banks. 
Further pieces of legislation were enacted through-out the 1970's. Law 97 of 1976 
gave Egyptians and foreign residents the right to keep their foreign currency holdings 
and deal and manage them in registered banks. At the same time, the state's 
monopoly on foreign trade was abolished on all except eighteen items, leaving the 
private sector to import freely goods of its choice. In 1979 a Government body 
known as the Capital Market Authority (CMA) was established with the aim of 
reviving activities on the stock exchange. Three years earlier this had been 
recommended in a report by the International Finance Corporation. 
As a result of recommendations made by the CMA three laws were drafted in 1981 -
Law 121 on General Regulations of the Egyptian Stock Exchanges; Law 157 on 
Income Tax; and Law 159, the new Companies Law. These were broadly aimed at 
permitting the stock of foreign companies and stocks in foreign currencies to be 
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listed at the exchange; provide protection for small savers; and, simplify the 
procedure for establishing a company.65 
Through broadening the country's financial base and increasing the sources and types 
of finance available to potential investors, the government believed that a spirit of 
competition might be engendered within the financial sector and, as a result, the 
economy as a whole. In addition, it was assumed that the import of modem banking 
technology would stimulate further reform and development, and most importantiy, 
that the presence of the new institutions would facilitate - if not encourage - an 
inflow of foreign exchange from abroad. The Egyptian government boldly envisaged 
Cairo assuming the financial mantle of war-torn Beirut. 66 
The response of the world's financial community to Sadat's programme of 
liberalisation can be seen in the number of projects approved by the investment 
authorities by the end of the third quarter of 1979.67 with the exception of 'other 
industries', banks and investment companies were not only the most numerous, 
accounting for almost 20% of all approved projects, but the most highly capitalised 
(27.5% of the total). In terms of investment outlay, this group was ranked second, 
and as far as the creation of jobs is concerned, banks and investment companies 
stood behind all concerns, except housing, contributing a mere 2% to the total 
number of jobs created. 
65 Mohareb, Nabil S Policy Measures for Development of Money Markets and Capital Markets an 
article taken from Middle East Executive Reports (Cairo: Middle East Executive Reports 
1986)pl4 
66 Hegazi, Abdel Aziz, former Prime Minister of Egypt in a private interview. 
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By 1981, the investment authorities had approved the establishment of 62 banks and 
129 investment companies, and by the end of 1987 financial institutions accounted 
for 18.8% of the total number of approved projects. 
This growth in the number of financial institutions is indicative of increased financial 
activity but more importantly, of the changing structure of the economy in the wake 
of the ODEP and the development of new sources of earnings. 
Between 1978 and 1981 deposits increased by 153% to £E10,890 million at an 
annual growth rate of 36.5%. By 1981 private sector deposits as a percentage of 
total banking sector deposits accounted for 64%. Loans similarly increased over this 
period, between these years recording an overall growth rate of 222%, foreign 
currency credits at a rate of 513% and loans to the private sector at 500%.68 
When considering deposits more closely, one can observe that between 1978 and 
1981 foreign currency deposits increased at an overall rate of 159% with an average 
annual increase of 38%. This compares with the increase in local currency deposits 
of 150% over the recorded period, an annual average increase of 36%. 
During the early years of liberalisation, foreign currency tended markedly more 
towards being held in foreign and joint venture banks than in the state owned 
commercial institutions, despite the enormity of these institutions. Five years after 
Law 43's enactment the state owned banks' combined deposit base of £E 5.9 billion 
amounted to 81% of all deposits and their credits were the equivalent of 83% of the 
total. Proportionally, these banks' local currency holdings were much greater than 
their foreign currency holdings, unlike the foreign and joint venture institutions. In 
1978/79, the foreign exchange accounts held in foreign banks amounted to £E 816 
68 Various editions of the Annual Report of the Central Bank of Egypt. 
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million out of a total of £E 2.05 billion in the banking system, whilst their local 
currency holdings amounted to £E 284 million out of a total of £E 3.9 billion.69 
This recorded increase in domestic currency deposits can be attributed to growing 
confidence and the enhanced status of the private sector under the ODEP; a 
succession of interest rate increases; and the introduction of legislation ensuring the 
fiscal exemption of income tax on bank interest. The increase in foreign currency 
deposits is due to the growth in foreign currency earners. The re-opening of the 
Suez Canal in the mid-1970's and the return of tourists to Egypt expanded the 
horizon for foreign exchange earnings, as did the country's export of oil from 1976. 
The oil price boom of the 1970's helped swell earnings whilst also providing great 
scope for employment opportunities for Egyptians in the Gulf States. With Egypt's 
population standing somewhere in the region of 36 million and employment 
opportunities being limited at home, this was naturally of great convenience to the 
government. The pressure to create jobs at home was lessened whilst at the same 
time a potential new source of investment capital was opening up. 
These earning trends are reflected in table 3.4 which highlights the main sources of 
foreign currency over selected years between 1976 and 1986/87. It reveals that 
remittances were consistently the largest source of foreign exchange, as a percentage 
of the total rising from 36.4% in 1976 to 58.5% in 1986/87; in terms of their value 
they rose almost ten times. Earnings from cotton exports, on the other hand, were 
the least valuable of the listed items in every year except 1976. As a percentage of 
the total they declined from 14% in 1976 to less than 5% in 1986/87. Petroleum 
exports proved to be the most erratic source of foreign currency, their value in 
1981/82 rising to £E1914 million, yet falling between 1984/85 and 1986/87 by 
69 Waterbury, John p 149 
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almost two thirds. It is this dramatic fall in the mid-1980's which is most 
significantly responsible for the total's £E504.1 million decline. 
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1976 154.8 0149.1 121.7 263.2 0393.8 108 
1979 267.3 0635.4 412.1 319.8 1449.8 3084 
1981/82 204.0 1914.6 636.2 317.5 1406.7 4479 
1984/85 290.0 1843.9 627.7 330.7 2621.6 5713 
1986/97 240.3 0634.1 803.6 481.2 3050.6 5209 
Source: National Bank of Egypt Economic Bulletin Vol. XL No. 1.2 1987 (Cairo: 
National Bank of Egypt 1987) p 126 
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The inevitable impact of many of the country's basic exports continuing this trend of 
decline can be witnessed in balance of payment figures approaching the end of the 
decade. Between the mid-1980"s and 1988/89 exports overall failed to grow, 
standing in 1988/89 as they had four years before at $3,600 million; the proportion 
of the exports derived from oil sales fell to under 40%. Whilst exports declined, 
imports grew - in less than half a decade by $1,000 million to reach $9,600 million 
by 1988/89.70 
Beset by the problems already indicated - difficulties in themselves yet compounded 
by a growth in already enormous debt servicing costs, a considerable domestic 
budget deficit and rising inflation, the government in Cairo was - and remains -
subject to constant pressure to alter its policies. At the forefront of those lobbying 
President Mubarak has been the IMF, eager to see him pursue policies of gradual but 
decisive liberalisation. The areas of reform he is being pressed to adopt have tended 
to focus on accentuating Egypt's potential - enhancing her international 
competitiveness; enabling the world to recognise the Nile lands as a place worthy of 
investment; and most importantly creating conditions whereby Egypt's concealed 
wealth might be exposed and brought to the benefit of the country. 
In short, the focus has been on reducing, if not eradicating those features of 
economic, political and financial life which have been working against the country's 
long term advantage. 
As far as the financial sector is concerned the desired areas of reform centre on 
foreign exchange policies, interest rate policies and the growth of the domestic 
budget deficit. 
70 Butter, David Egypt: Remaking the Arab Connection (London: Middle East Economic Digest 
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Egyptian governments have long been criticised for the manner in which they have 
managed foreign exchange, particularly the way in which they have controlled it 
through their exchange rate policies. Whilst tight control over the exchange rate was 
maintained during the 1960's, only partial liberalisation has occurred since then. A 
recent report suggested that since the mid-1970's the fragmented and highly 
overvalued exchange rates operating in Egypt have acted as a disincentive for her 
exporters." !^ 
Beyond the fact that the rate is overvalued, further difficulties relate to the fact that 
the purchase of foreign exchange by Egyptians for almost all personal uses is 
prohibited. For those purchases that are permitted, two legal rates of exchange exist, 
the Commercial Bank rate and the Central Bank rate. Both of these are considered 
overvalued, a problem in itself which is compounded by the fact that demand 
exceeds supply. The consequent result is the existence of a black market rate, the so-
called 'parallel market' rate."^ 2 
The Central Bank rate is used to record the government's major sources of revenue 
which include proceeds from the Suez Canal and the Sumed pipeline, and the exports 
of petroleum, rice and cotton. These funds are then applied to the import of a 
variety of key commodities at the same rate. The commodities range from foodstuffs 
to a variety of agricultural products. The rate is also applied to the servicing of the 
nation's massive external debt. 
1^ Sherif, Khaled Fouad Egypt's Liberalisation Experience & its Impact on State Owned 
Enterprise Industrial Performance (Chicago: University of Chicago 1989) pp 21-23 
^2 Embassy of the USA in Cairo Egyptian Economic Trends (Cairo: Embassy of the USA in 
Cairo 1990) p 8 
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The Commercial Bank rate is calculated daily by a group of public and private 
sector bankers who, in theory at least, base their deliberations on demand and 
supply. The rate is applied to the private exchange of foreign currency which the 
government insists must be by banks or through bank accounts. Banks are authorised 
to sell foreign exchange from their pool (only) to finance imports, for foreign 
currency repatriation and to a limited extent for private foreign debt service. The 
fact that demand for foreign exchange from this source exceeds supply, has resulted 
in the existence of a third rate. In that this channel involves trading both through 
private foreign currency accounts in banks and trading outside accounts, it has 
elements of legality and illegality about it! Whilst at one stage regarded as possibly 
the most accurate rate (in terms of its response to demand and supply patterns), the 
efforts of the government and police in clamping down on it has had a distorting 
effect. 
These policies the IMF has urged the government to reform, suggesting that a unified 
and more accurate rate of exchange might not only deter capital flight but enhance 
Egypt's international competitiveness, thereby promoting new investment and 
establishing better opportunities for exporters. The government responded in 1987 
by freeing the commercial bank rate with a 40% devaluation. In the two years that 
followed, a total of $6,200 million flowed into the free commercial bank foreign 
exchange pool. $17 million was used to settle private sector exchange liabilities. 
Since that time, the committee of bankers which regulates the rate has failed to 
maintain the trend of devaluation at a pace sufficient to preserve the balance between 
supply and demand. By the end of the decade the rate was again estimated to be 
overvalued. 
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A similarly cautious response has been the hallmark of the government's approach to 
interest rate policies. Whilst the rate has risen during the 1970's and the 1980's, its 
true significance can only be seen when set alongside the inflation rate.73 with this 
currently standing at around 30% and the highest rate of interest at well less than 
20% a situation is created which encourages the holding of capital in foreign 
exchange and capital flight. Inflation has been fuelled by a large budget deficit and 
excessive monetary expansion, the deficit in the late 1980's being the equivalent to 
18% GNP. 
The Cairo government has been reluctant to reduce the massive programmes of 
subsidies which lie behind the deficit on the scale advocated by the IMF. There is, 
however, growing debate throughout Egypt about the nature of the subsidies and who 
should benefit by them. 
Traditionally, subsidies have been channelled towards state owned enterprises and the 
general public as a whole. They have taken the form of direct cash subsidies; been 
channelled through the banks towards particular groups or sectors; or, been exercised 
as price control measures in the form of tariffs or trade barriers. In implementing a 
variety of price increases during the late 1980's, the government appeared to 
recognise that a reduction in the deficit could assist the process of controlling 
inflation. At the same time it started discussing the problem of the vast and 
burdensome state owned sector, particularly the ownership of it and the means by 
which it should be financed. 
73 Amiual Report of the Central Bank of Egypt various editions 
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3.5 Economic Considerations Today 
Consideration of the Second Five Year Plan for Socio-Economic Development 
(1987/88 -1991/2) enables us to see the manner in which the government envisages 
the economy's development as Egypt edges its way into the 1990's. 
The Plan is based on three underlying objectives,74 the first of which centres upon 
the need for the Egyptian economy to finance its own development. This, it is 
envisaged, can be done through reducing imports, increasing domestic production 
and enhancing export potential. It is considered a crucial goal, given the 
susceptibility of the economy to 'external currents of change, considerations and 
influences beyond its control'. 
The second objective deals with the social and material infrastructure - reforming it 
with the goal of stimulating development and investment, enabling the 'negative 
impact of bottle-necks' to be avoided. The final objective looks to addressing the 
population's rate of growth and the challenge the government is faced with in trying 
to cope with it. The Plan states, 'The responsibility for filling the basic needs of 
nearly 70 million people by the end of the century is fundamentally different from 
simply providing for quantitative change, since the type, nature and extent of Egypt's 
requirements will have changed, as will its ability to meet them.' Stark issues face 
the Egyptian government. 
Table 3.5 details the GDP over the lifetime of the Plan, which is in itself expected 
to rise by 5.8%. The Commodity Sector is the largest of the sectors in terms of 
74 Second Five Year Plan for Socio-Economic Development 1987/88 - 1991/92 (Cairo: 1987) 
pp5-8 
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relative importance, averaging over the recorded years 48.4%, compared with the 
Production Services Sector (33.6%) and the Social Services Sector (17.9%). Of 
particular note in the Commodity Sector is the decline in oil and oil products from 
4.1% to 3.5%, a trend echoed in agriculture's decline from 21.1% to 19.5%. In 
comparison, industry and mining as a unit rises from 17.0% to 19.2%, putting it on 
a par by the end of the Plan with agriculture. 
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Table 3.5 GDP in 1991/92 compared to the tar2eted in 1987/88 and 
the expected in 1986/87 at 1986/87 prices 
Sector Relative Importance (%) Growth Rate 
/Year 86/87 87/88 91/92 87/88 91/92 
Agriculture 21.1 20.8 19.5 03.7 04.1 
Industry & mining 17.0 17.3 19.2 07.4 08.4 
Oil & oil products 04.1 04.1 03.5 04.7 02.3 
Electricity 01.3 01.3 01.3 08.1 07.1 
Construction 04.9 05.0 04.9 07.0 05.9 
Total Commoditv Sector 48.4 48.5 48.4 05.5 05.8 
Transport, communications 09.2 09.1 08.9 04.6 05.1 
& Suez Canal 
Commerce, finance & 23.6 23.5 23.3 04.9 05.5 
insurance 
Tourism 01.0 01.0 01.3 06.3 10.9 
Total Production Service 33.8 33.6 33.5 04.8 05.6 
Sector 
Housing & public utilities 02.0 02.1 02.6 09.2 11.4 
Personal & social services 04.5 04.4 04.4 04.4 05.2 
Government services 11.7 11.4 11.1 06.5 05.5 




Total Value Production Services 
Sector 
Total Value Social Services 
1987/88 








Source: Butter, David pl3 
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Although the value of the Production Services Sector increases by £E 4.3102 billion 
over the period of the Plan, its relative importance declines from 33.8% to 33.5%, 
the only sector to do so. Tourism is the only area within the Production Services 
Sector to increase in terms of relative importance, rising from 1.0% to 1.3%. It 
remains slight in terms of value, being dwarfed over the period of the Plan by 
commerce, finance and insurance, which averages £E6.59231 billion. 
The Social Services Sector is the only one to increase, in terms of relative 
importance from 17.8% to 18.1%. Housing and public utilities are set to increase, 
and in the year 1991/92 annual growth is expected to be 11.4%. This is the largest 
area of growth, followed by tourism (10.9%) and industry and mining (8.4%). At 
the other end of the spectrum, oil and oil products are only expected to increase by 
2.3%, ti-ansport, communications and Suez by 5.1% and personal and social services 
by 5.2%. 
Overall, the annual growth rate in 1991/92 is expected at 1986/97 prices to be 5.8%. 
Many economists, however, believe that the government will be hard pressed to 
achieve this, particularly as extremely low rates of growth have been recorded in 
recent years. 
Consideration of the sources of investment [see table 3.6] reveals that in both the 
Commodity and Social Service Sectors the private sector is expected to provide the 
bulk of the finance. Overall the bulk of investment is directed towards the 
Commodity Sectors, the least towards the Production Services Sector. Although 
there are six areas in which private sector investment is excluded, compared with 
none for the public sector, the private sector is nevertheless expected to provide the 
lion's share in three specific areas: agriculture, industry and mining, and housing. 
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Table 3.6 Investment expenditure by economic sectors in the five year plan 
(1987/88 - 1991/92) 
Relative Structure (%) 
Sectors Public Private Total 
Agriculture 
Irrigation & drainage 
Industry & mining 
Oil & oil products 
Electricity 
Construction 























Finance & insurance 
Tourism 




















Housing 00.6 36.6 14.8 
Public utilities 14.4 - 08.7 
Education services 05.9 00.2 03.6 
Health services 02.9 00.3 01.9 
Other social services 03.9 00.1 02.4 
Total Social Services 27.0 37.2 31.4 
Sector 
Grand Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Butter, David p53 
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The challenges faced by the Egyptian government are great, and there can be no 
underestimating the immediate and constant nature of them. The remainder of this 
thesis considers the current status of the financial sector and its role in alleviating 
some of the difficulties. 
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Chapter 4 The Financial Sector Today 
This chapter takes the form of an assessment of the activities of the financial sector 
in Egypt today. It concentrates initially on the banking sector, considering its 
structure; the regulatory environment in which it is required to operate, (as 
controlled by the Central Bank); and the government's approach to monetary policy. 
It then outlines the activities and roles of the banks in Egypt according to three 
classifications, namely Commercial Banks, Business and Investment Banks, and 
Specialised Banks. 
In the second section the activities of non-banking institutions are discussed: 
insurance companies, the stock exchange and Islamic financial institutions. 
4.1 The Structure of the Banking Sector 
Table 4.1 reveals the structure of the banking sector in Egypt today. From it we can 
see that three different categories of banks fall beneath the control of the Central 
Bank of Egypt, that is to say Commercial Banks, Business and Investment Banks, 
and Specialised Banks. Each of these categories is sub-divided to reveal details of 
ownership, whether public, joint venture or foreign, and in the case of the 
Specialised Banks - all of which are publicly owned - the nature of the institutions' 
business, whether industrial development, real estate or agriculture. These sub-
divisions also outline the number of institutions, according to ownership or activity, 
and the overall number of branches. 
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Table 4.1 The structure of the Egyptian Banking Sector 
Commercial Banks 
4 public sector 
633 branches 




Investment & Business 
Banks 
11 joint venture 




Industrial Devt Bank 
3 branches 
2 real estate banks 
11 branches 
Principal Bank for 
Credit, & 17 subordinate 
732 village banks 
Source: Central Bank of Eevpt Annual Report 1988/89 (Cairo: Centi-al Bank of 
Egypt 1989) p 135 plus additional information supplied directiy by a Central 
Bank spokesman. 
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Of the differing types of institutions outiined in the table, joint venture banks and 
foreign bank branches, operating under the categorisations of Commercial and 
Business and Investment Banks, are of the most recent origin, their creation dating to 
the origins of Law 43 in 1974. All other types of institutions were in operation in the 
period immediately prior to the introduction of the Open Door Policy. In addition to 
the institutions recorded in the table, there exist three outwith conti-ol of the Central 
Bank. They are the Arab International Bank, the Nasser Social Bank and 
Manufactures Hanover Trust Company. 
An analysis of the figures makes it apparent that commercial banking institutions are 
the most numerous, accounting for 44% of the total number of institutions. These 
are followed by business and investment institutions (34%) and then specialised 
institutions (22%). The domineering role of the commercial institutions is also 
reflected in the distribution of branches, in that they account for 51% of the total. 
However, treating 'village banks' as branches boosts the position of specialised 
institutions to second place (43%), displacing business and investment institutions 
(5%) to third place. 
When we consider the figures relating to ownership, private and foreign combined 
compared to public, we see that private institutions are almost three times more 
numerous than public (71 : 25). However, in terms of the number of branches, the 
public sector institutions have just under five times as many branches as the private 
and foreign sectors combined (1409 : 310). Within the public sector, this means that 
there are roughly 56 branches for every bank, compared with 4 in the private and 
foreign sectors. 
These figures indicate the following in relation to the impact of the ODEP on the 
structure of the banking sector: 
79 
- since the ODEP's enactment, the banking sector has witnessed the appearance of 
new categories of institutions, whether in terms of function or ownership 
- 'Business and Investment' banks, a new category of institution in terms of 
function, operate under new categories of ownership, whether as joint ventures or 
foreign bank branches 
- Commercial banks also operate as joint ventures, although not as foreign bank 
branches 
- the presence of these new institutions has had a marked impact on the total number 
of institutions in operation, although public sector banks - whilst small in number -
remain dominant when the total number of branches is taken into account 
- 'Law 43 institutions', totalling 77 in number, account for 74% of the total 
recorded number of institutions (96), their branches some 18% of the total of 1719 
branches. 
4.2 The Regulatory Environment 
Article 1 of Law 120 of 1975 states that the Central Bank of Egypt is, 'an 
autonomous public legal entity which regulates monetary, credit and banking policy 
and supervises its fostering in accordance with the general plan of the State with a 
view to developing and fostering the national economy and maintaining the stability 
of the Egyptian currency'. 
In seeking to uphold this regulatory duty it employs a variety of tools, including the 
following:- influencing the orientation of credit; participating in the arrangement for 
external credit; adopting suitable measures to combat general and local economic or 
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financial disturbances; fixing discount rates; and participating in the preparation of 
the State's foreign exchange budget. 
The most important of these tools and the manner in which they are employed are 
discussed below: 
Reserve Requirement Ratios 
Since 1980, banks have been required to place in the Central Bank 25 % of their local 
currency deposits interest free, providing the maturities of these deposits are less than 
two years old. In addition, 15% of foreign currency deposits are also required to be 
placed in the Bank but at international interest rates (LIBOR). 
Bank Interest Rates 
Despite the fact that all rates remain negative, in that they are below the anticipated 
rate of inflation, interest rates have succeeded in attracting an increased volume of 
money into the banking system in recent years. Today, rates on deposits range from 
7.5% for one to two month deposits to 16% for deposits of seven years and more. 
These figures compare with 1977's distribution of rates of between 4% and 6%. 
Whilst in 1977 rates on loans and advances stood between 8% and 9% for all sectors, 
in 1989 they were differentiated according to sector, a practice dating to 1983. In 
1989 agriculture and industry were charged rates of between 13% and 17%, the 
services sector between 15% and 19% and the commercial sector 18%.'^ ^ 
al-Tahri, Naveen representative of the Commercial International Bank in a private interview 
^6 Annual Report of the Central Bank of Egypt various editions 
81 
Sectoral credit growth ceiling 
This has been employed since 1981 when the CBE started to maintain specific 
restrictions on growth of bank credit to the commercial and household sectors. 
Banks are given limits on expansion of their lending to these sectors, recently in the 
order of 10% per annum, and overall they may not advance total loans worth more 
than 60% of deposits. Since 1982 no further facilities have been granted for the sale 
or purchase of imported cars or consumer durables.^ ^ 
Open market operations 
These are not regarded as an important tool on account of a shortage of marketable 
financial instruments. This shortage reflects the gap between issuing rates and 
market rates. The government depends heavily, as an alternative, on borrowings 
from the CBE and commercial public sector banks, although efforts have been made 
recently to increase the rate on bonds and issue new ones denominated in foreign 
currency. 
Egyptian Economic Trends p 11 
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4.3 Commercial Banks 
Law 120 of 1975 defines commercial banks as institutions that, '...usually accept 
deposits payable on demand or within fixed periods; carry out internal or external 
financing...in such a manner as to achieve the objectives of the development plan and 
the State's policy as well as fostering of the national economy; effect operations for 
the promotion of savings and for financial investment locally and abroad, including 
the participation in the establishment of projects as well as banking, commercial and 
financial operations'. 
Commercial banks today account for 44% of all banks operating in Egypt, their 
branches 51% of the total. Whilst the vast majority of these institutions within this 
category are joint ventures, this particular comer of the sector is overshadowed by 
the presence of the 'big four' state owned institutions. Not only do these dominate 
as single entities but also as joint venture partners. 
The overall size of these institutions can be seen when we compare both total 
deposits of the commercial banks (£E48,871 million) and their assets / liabilities 
(£E70.617 million) with export earnings in the year 1988/89. These amounted to 
£E3,383.4 million. Figures are not available to assess the collective might of the 
'big four', however, an insight to their size can be obtained by revealing that the 
National Bank of Egypt's deposits amounted to £E11,763 million in 1988/89, a 
figure representing over 24% of the total commercial bank deposits;"^ ^ those of the 
Banque Misr represented 25%.^^ 
Spokesman for the National Bank of Egypt 
79 Banque Misr Annual Report 1988/89 
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Considering the aggregate financial position of the commercial banks (table 4.2), the 
most outstanding features are loans and discounting, and deposits. In relative terms 
these represent 38% and 69% respectively, loans as a percentage of deposits standing 
at 55%. This figure falls within the upper limit for loans which the Central Bank 
allows such institutions to advance. 
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Table 4.2 The aggregate financial position of Commercial Banks. 1989 
(£E millions) 
Assets 
Amount Relative Importance 
Cash 00840 
Securities & investments 07627 
Balances with banks in Egypt 14960 
Balances with banks abroad 12755 
Loans and discounting 27001 










Bonds & long term loans 00191 
Obligations to banks in Egypt 03965 
Obligations to banks abroad 04895 
Total deposits 48871 







Source: Central Bank of Egvpt Annual Report 1988/89 p 121 
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Looking at the recipients of these loans by sectoral distribution, we see that the 
private business sector received 49%, public sector companies and the government 
32% and 14%, and the household and foreign sectors 3% and 2%. By economic 
activity, this distribution works out at agriculture and industry receiving 42% and the 
trade sector 31%, representing a fall of two percentage points over the financial year. 
83% of these loans were of short term duration.^ 0 
Both agriculture and industry have been targeted by the government as areas where 
they would like to see growth and development, reducing the nation's reliance and 
dependence on trade. Accordingly, interest rates for these two sectors were set in 
1989 between 13% and 15% for loans of one year or less. Those directed at the 
trade sector stood at 18% for the same period, 
To appreciate the state owned - joint venture split, and something of the impact of 
the joint ventures on the sector, it is worth comparing two institutions, one state 
owned, the other joint venture. 
The National Bank of Egypt was founded in 1898 with an initial share capital of £E 1 
million. Its primary purpose was to serve as a bank of issue, maintain the accounts of 
the government and undertake commercial banking activities. Since 1960, it has 
been wholly owned by the government, and on the creation of the Central Bank it 
dropped its central banking functions to maintain a role within the commercial field. 
With assets of £E14,677 million, the NBE is Egypt's top ranking bank both at home 
and abroad, sporting 233 branches and deposits in 1987/88 to the value of £E9,681 
million. 82 
80 CBE Annual Report 1988/89 p 52 
81 CBE Annual Report 1988/89 p 132 
82 National Bank of Egvpt Annual Report (various editions) 
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The Commercial International Bank cannot match the NBE, whether in terms of 
longevity, the volume of assets or the number of branches. Within Egypt the bank is 
ranked tenth, and within the Arab world seventy seventh. This was Egypt's first 
joint venture, the fruit of a union between the National Bank of Egypt and the Chase 
Manhattan Bank of New York. In 1987 Chase sold all of its shares bar 0.3% to the 
NBE, leaving the CIB in the delicate situation of being all but a state owned 
institution. The bank has a dozen branches, largely located in the capital and 
Alexandria, assets worth £E1,624 million and deposits worth £E1,163 million. 
Great though these discrepancies may be, they are not reflected as might be expected 
when one compares the profits the two institutions amassed in 1987. In that year the 
NBE's pre-tax profits, as a percentage of assets, stood at 2.06%, whilst those of the 
CIB at 3.71%. By 1989 the CIB reported a 35% increase in net profits, topping 
those of the NBE with a balance sheet more than ten times as large. With the CIB 
advancing a higher proportion of loans to industry and a lower proportion to trade 
and finance than the NBE - all areas perceived as being either 'risky' or 'easy' - the 
following chapter reveals the differences in approaches of such banks, and some of 
the factors which have enabled the NBE's initial stake in the CIB of £E2.5 million in 
1975 to grow to almost £E300 million. 
al-Tahri , Naveen of the Commercial International Bank & Commercial International Bank 
Annual Report various editions 
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4.4 Business and Investment Banks 
Law 120's definition of business and investment banks enables us to distinguish how 
they differ from commercial banks. Whereas commercial banks accept deposits, 
'payable on demand or within fixed periods', investment banks carry out operations 
related to the 'pooling and promotion of savings for the sake of investment'. These 
institutions may establish companies, and also undertake the financing of Egypt's 
foreign trade operations. 
Comparing the aggregate financial positions of the two categories of banks reveals a 
number of marked differences. (See table 4.3) Taking assets of the business and 
investment banks, we see that the combined balances with banks in Egypt and abroad 
is £E 8422 million, 46% in terms of relative importance. This compares with 39% 
for commercial banks. Lending and discounting balances within the two different 
types of banks can be broadly equated in terms of relative importance, whilst there is 
a marked difference between the relative importance of securities and investments. 
Within business and investment banks this stands at 3%, compared with 11% in the 
commercial banks. 
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Table 4.3 The aggregate financial position of Business & Investment Banks. 
1989 
(£E millions) 
Amount Relative Importance 
Assets 
Cash 0094 
Securities & investments 0474 03 
Balances with banks in Egypt 3341 18 
Balances with banks abroad 5081 28 
Lending & discount balances 7565 41 
Other assets 1811 10 
Liabilities 
Equities 1120 06 
Provisions 1094 06 
Bonds & loans 0029 
Obligations to banks in Egypt 4511 25 
Obligations to banks abroad 2305 12 
Total deposits 6961 38 
Other liabilities 2346 13 
Source: Central Bank of Egvpt Annual Report 1988/89 p 122 
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On the liabilities side, again there is a marked difference between the combined 
obligations to banks in Egypt and abroad (37% in terms of relative importance for 
business and investment banks, compared to 13% for commercial institutions). All 
other items except deposits, can be broadly equated. Commercial banks are 
considerably more dependent on these (69% of liabilities) than business and 
investment banks (38%). 
Credit classification by sector84 reveals that the private business sector received 54% 
of total loans, the foreign sector 21%, the government sector 17%, and public sector 
companies and the household sector 5% and 3% respectively. Within terms of 
economic activity, the relative share of agriculture and industry was 20% (a rise of 3 
percentage points over the course of the financial year) and trade 26% (a fall of 2 
percentage points). The high proportion of loans to the foreign sector can possibly 
be explained on account of the make up of ownership of this category of banks, that 
is to say, largely foreign or joint venture, and the banks' facilities for dealing in 
foreign currency. 
Such figures would appear to indicate that despite their name and legal definition, 
business and investment banks tend not to concentrate on investment but rather loans. 
They would also appear to act as clearing houses and to a large extent are dependent 
on interbank activities, whether domestic or international. 
Perhaps the most prominent business and investment bank operating in Egypt today 
is the Misr Iran Development Bank. Founded in 1975, this institution concentrates 
on investing in the high priority sectors of the economy, as indicated in the 
government's Social and Economic Development Plans. By the end of 1988 the 
bank had participated in the establishment of 69 projects in total, the majority of 
84 CBE Annual Report 1988/89 p 55 
90 
which were industrial (40%). In its belief that, 'project development does not 
require financing only - knowledge of the technical process, management and 
organisation are equally vital' the MIDB is insistent on assessing all aspects of a 
project prior to considering whether it worthy of funding. With representation on the 
boards of the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones, the General 
Organisation for Industrialisation, the Specialised National Councils and a variety of 
other government agencies, the MIDB feels it is well placed to assess the mood of 
the government and is also afforded a degree of access to information and data which 
the market does not readily give up. 
The bank claims that one indicator of the quality of its service can be seen in its 
distribution of loans over time. In 1988 the bank provided loans of medium to long 
term in duration to the value of $77.9 million, whilst its short term loans stood at 
$35.49 million. This long term - short term balance is not widely reflected across 
the banking sector. In both 1987 and 1988 the bank itself received loans from the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.^ ^ 
When we look at combined loans and discount balances of commercial and business 
and investment banks over the three years (See table 4.4) we see that the private 
business sector has consistentiy enjoyed the lion's share, whilst the household sector 
has benefited least. At the same time that the government's share has declined, that 
of the public sector has increased. When considered by type of activity, we see that 
whilst agriculture has consistently remained the least significant item, industry has 
risen, in terms of relative importance from 30% to 35%. Most importantiy, as far as 
the government is concerned, trade has dropped from 36% to 29%, although it 
nevertheless remains an item of great significance and importance. 
85 Misr Iran Development Bank Annual Report (various editions) & Dr Nabil Mohareb of the Misr 
Iran Development Bank in a private interview 
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Table 4.4 Loans & discount balances granted bv Commercial Banks 
& Business & Investment Banks. 1987 - 1989 
(By sector & economic activity.) 
(£E millions) 
1987 
amount / relative 
importance 
1988 







25276 / 100 30580 / 100 34566/100 
Govt sector 
Public sector cos. 
Private bus. sector 
Household sector 
Foreign sector 
04978 / 20 
05587 / 22 
12541 / 50 
00636 / 02 
01534 / 06 
04761 / 16 
07477 / 24 
15234 / 50 
00779 / 02 
02329 / 08 
05341 / 15 
08964 / 26 
17288 / 50 
00994 / 03 
02079 / 06 
over / 
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by type of activity 
Agriculture 0629 / 03 
Industi^ 7699 / 30 
Trade 9170 / 36 
Services 5246 / 21 
Undistiibuted sectors 2532 / 10 
00783 / 03 
10186 / 33 
09615 / 32 
06510 / 21 
03486/ 11 
00936 / 03 
11955 / 35 
10201 / 29 
07904 / 23 
03570 / 10 
Source: Central Bank of Egypt Annual Report 1988/89 p 125 
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4.5 Specialised Banks 
An immediate glance at the aggregate financial position of specialised banks (those 
institutions said to, 'serve a specific type of economic activity and for which the 
acceptance of demand deposits is not one of their main fields of activity') reveals 
[see table 4.5] the overwhelming relative importance of lending and discount 
balances (72%) in terms of assets, and in terms of liabilities the dependence on 
obligations to banks in Egypt and deposits (a combined 67%). Securities and 
investments, and balances with banks in Egypt and abroad are negligible; other assets 
are, regretfully, not detailed for closer examination. 
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Table 4.5 Aggregate financial position of Specialised Banks. 1989 
(£E millions) 
Amount Relative Importance 
Assets 
Cash 0002 
Securities & investments 0109 01 
Balances with banks in Egypt 0047 01 
Balances with banks abroad 0041 01 
Lending & discount balances 5377 72 
Other assets 1856 25 
Liabilities 
Equities 0348 05 
Provisions 0335 04 
Bonds & loans 0715 10 
Obligations to banks in Egypt 3312 44 
Obligations to banks abroad 0034 
Total deposits 1679 23 
Other liabilities 1009 14 
Source: Central Bank of Egvpt Annual Report 1988/89 p 127 
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Details of loans granted by specialised banks [see table 4.6] reveal that they are 
essentially shared out between the government and private business sectors, the latter 
receiving almost 75% of all those allocated. The household sector receives a 
minimal amount, whilst the foreign sector and public sector companies do not receive 
anything at all. By types of activity, we see that agriculture absorbs 50% of the 






by debtor sectors 
Loans granted by Specialised Banks. 1989 
(by sector and economic activity) 
(£E million) 
Amount Relative Importance 
5377 100 
Government sector 1363 
Public sector companies 0021 
Private business sector 3792 
Household sector 0199 
Foreign sector 0002 














Source: Central Bank of Egypt Annual Report 1988/89 p 130 
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Details are not published enabling us to adjudge the types of loans granted by 
specialised banks, however, the relative importance of loans granted to the trade 
sector and the agricultural sector suggests that loans probably do not weigh as heavily 
on the short term side as we have seen with other categories of banks. 
Agriculture, on the whole, would appear to be an area from which private or foreign 
owned institutions shy. This is likely to be on account of the long term nature of 
investment that this sector requires. Trade, on the other hand, requires short term 
finance. Where the government has attempted to discriminate throughout the sector 
against trade by manipulating interest rates, institutions would not appear to have 
been deterred from advancing trade finance. Additional costs for servicing a loan 
can easily be passed on to customers. Real estate, although requiring long term 
investment, is an area of considerable investment, the returns being almost assured 
and a physical asset being the essential result. 
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4.6 Insurance Companies 
The importance of insurance companies can be seen today in terms of the sheer 
volume of investments available to them. In the 1970's, insurance companies were 
among the first group of institutions to be reorganised under the ODEP. Many of 
the foreign and privately owned firms had been nationalised or confiscated by 
Nasser. 
There currently exist in Egypt four public sector institutions, one of which deals with 
reinsurance. In addition, there are three private sector companies and two joint 
ventures. 
Unlike banking institutions, insurance companies obtain their resources by means of 
periodic instalments, in the case of life insurance policies. Instalments due by policy 
holders or others are paid at the same time. Until required to pay reparations, 
insurance companies must merely be able to ensure a good return on investments, 
and ensure the maintenance of an appropriate level of liquidity. 
Whilst traditionally insurance companies have dealt with real estate, table 4.7 reveals 
the sector's investments in 1989. It also reveals the enormity of its investments. 
The figure £E22.5303 billion can be compared with the total deposits held in 
commercial banks (£E48.871 billion), the equivalent of 46%. 
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Table 4.7 Investments of the Insurance Sector. 1989 
(£E millions) 
Real estate & land 
Government securities 
Loans 







Source: Central Bank of Egvpt Annual Report 1988/89 pl36 
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As can be seen, these investments are directed towards four areas: real estate and 
land, government securities, loans and cash deposits at banks. The most sizeable 
item is loans, 99% of which are directed to the government (£E 16.881 billion). In 
that government securities are the recipient of 18.5% of investments, the state is a 
beneficiary, to the general exclusion of other sectors. 
Given the characteristics of the insurance sector pointed out earlier, there is clearly a 
great potential for it to make a sizeable portion of its investment available for 
medium to long term finance. The sources of investment revealed in the table, 
however, suggest that the general inclination is to pursue business involving the least 
degree of risk. 
4.7 Islamic Institutions 
One of the areas of Egyptian finance notable in recent years for its growth and 
popularity has been that of Islamic finance. This has revolved around the attempts 
made to reconcile commercial transactions with the teaching of the Quran. Islam 
preaches that interest should be prohibited on lent and borrowed funds; that hoarding 
should be discouraged; and that money should be put to productive use for the good 
of individuals, as well as that of the community. 
The use of funds employed by Islamic institutions takes the form of financing 
projects and operations in partnership with individuals or institutions. These 
generally take one of three forms: 
86 Structural Development of the Egyptian Financial Market (Cairo: USAID 1984) p 37 
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Musharkah - the bank finances the project, possibly with the assistance of the client 
who runs the project. Profits are distributed at pre-determined rates, and any loss 
falls on the shoulders of the bank. The client may buy out the bank's share in time, 
enabling the terms of maturity to be reached. 
Mudarbah - this is basically the equivalent of short term facilities as found in 
'institutional' banking circles. It is used to finance working capital, or trade finance. 
The bank provides all of the funds needed to finance an operation which can then be 
repaid on a similar basis to Musharkah. 
Murabhah - the bank purchases the commodity or good on behalf of the client and 
later resells it to him at a price agreed in advance. 
The three best known Islamic institutions operating in Egypt today are the Nasser 
Social Bank, the Faisal Islamic Bank and the Islamic International Bank for 
Investment and Development. 
Set alongside business & investment banking and commercial operations in 1985, the 
combined balance sheet of these three particular institutions amounts to 50.5% of 
the balance sheet of investment and business banks and 10% of commercial banks. 
This gives us an idea of the significance and popularity of such institutions within the 
financial sector. 
The very success of Islamic investment companies succeeded in attracting a 
significant proportion of private savings and channelling them away from the official 
banking system during the 1980's. With a rate of return ('interest') often 10 
percentage points higher than that offered by traditional banks, between two and 
Hasan, Mahrous A p 143 
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three million customers were attracted to such firms as al-Rayan with deposits of 
$2000 million - $3500 million.88 The combined assets of all Islamic companies was 
estimated in the region of $20 000 million. 
Speculation on foreign exchange markets led some of these firms into severe 
financial difficulties in the late 1980's. In an effort to reign in on the institutions, the 
government enacted Law 146 of 1988. This required them to submit themselves to 
closer scrutiny by the Capital Markets Authority; lodge funds in government 
monitored bank accounts; publish balance sheets; pay a certain percentage of deposits 
into a special indemnity fund in case of losses; and issue stock ownership certificates 
to depositors as a further protection for their savings. 
4.8 The Stock Exchange 
In the last chapter the establishment of the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) within 
the framework of the ODEP was recorded, an act which the government envisaged 
would boost the activities of the stock exchange. Table 4.8 reveals the historical 
market value of bond and share trading since the mid-1950's, demonstrating not only 
the consequences of the CMA's establishment but the impact of Nasser's programme 
of nationalisation. A trend of decline dates from 1958, falling most dramatically in 
1963. Negligible levels of performance, are also the characteristic of the 1970's. It 
is only over 1982/83 that we see an upward trend significantiy increase, a feature of 
performance reflective of the remainder of the recorded period. This trend marks the 
impact of the legislation implemented in the wake of the CMA's establishment. 
88 Middle East & North Africa 1989 (London: Europa Publications Ltd 1989) pp 387-388 
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Table 4.8 Historical market value of bond & share trading 
(year / £E millions) 
1956 - 57.3 1964 - 04.3 1972 - 03.9 1980 - 009.8 
1957 - 32.7 1965 - 02.8 1973 - 04.3 1981 - 009.1 
1958 - 66.7 1966 - 04.0 1974 - 04.1 1982 - 007.8 
1959 - 43.9 1967 - 06.5 1975 - 07.4 1983 - 025.0 
1960 - 38.4 1968 - 02.8 1976 - 07.6 1984 - 047.2 
1961 - 23.4 1969 - 06.3 1977 - 05.9 1985 - 077.3 
1962 - 12.2 1970 - 03.8 1978 - 04.9 1986 - 111.3 
1963 - 05.1 1971 - 03.6 1979 - 06.4 1987 - 177.7 
Source: National Bank of Egypt Bulletin (Cairo: National Bank of Egypt) (various 
editions) 
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The impact of the ODEP can be noted most graphically when we look at the number 
of companies quoted on the stock exchange. A decade after the ODEP's inception 
the number of companies stood in excess of 300 and by 1989 this figure had 
increased to 490. Of these, under a third (147) were open to public subscription. 
The listing of the others merely reflects compliance with the Companies Law and 
Stock Exchange Regulations. Given the increase in the numbers of companies listed 
since the mid- 1970's, the number of shares naturally also increased, reaching 348 
million in 1989. Issued capital stood at £E 2.1311 billion.89 
Impressive though these figures may appear, they do not reflect the volume of trade 
in securities. In 1985, 337 companies had their shares listed on the exchanges. The 
issued capital of the companies, which totalled £E 1.9 billion, represented 244 
million shares. Despite this, however, the volume of trade in securities was a mere 
£E 125.8 million. About 30% of this figure (£E 40.5 million) was traded through 
direct negotiations outside the exchanges. 
The performance in 1985 was not a year in isolation but very much indicative of the 
depressed nature of the activities of the stock exchange as a whole. 
Only two government bonds are quoted on the stock exchange, $US development 
bonds and housing bonds. The trading pattern of these is similar to that of securities 
- considerably depressed. Funds needed by the government and the public sector are 
secured through direct access to the banking system and the great pension and social 
security fund pools. No market mechanism is followed and the interest rate on these 
lOU's is fixed by the Central Bank.^i 
89 Mohareb, Nabil S p 16 
90 Vice President of the Cairo Stock Exchange in a private interview 
91 Mohareb, Nabil S p 16 
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In the next chapter, some of the measures that could be undertaken to rectify such 
difficulties and utilise the stock exchange more effectively are discussed. 
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Chapter 5 The Operating Climate 
In assessing the climate in which the financial sector operates and the areas in which 
its development is possibly hampered we are led into examining the attitudes, ideals 
and aspirations of all those involved in the 'financial process', along with Egypt's 
political, economic and social circumstances. 
A goodly portion of the information in this chapter was obtained through 
interviewing - on both a formal and informal basis - a variety of individuals with 
some insight into the sector. These ranged from members of the general public to 
bankers, stockbrokers, financiers and lawyers, from members of the government to 
journalists, academics and diplomats. Of those interviewed, a certain number were 
eager to ensure that their names were not associated with their remarks. Others 
stressed that their views were not necessarily reflective of the organisations 
employing them, or which they represented. This accounts for the fact that some 
interviewees are not mentioned specifically by name but referred to by their initials, 
and that certain organisations are only mentioned by way of description. 
Conversations with Egyptian friends, chance encounters whilst staying in Cairo, 
along with the city's taxi drivers, added to the base of the information. Together 
with news items, information gathered from a variety of other sources and a basic 
but reasonable understanding of the country and its history on the part of the author -
all have contributed to the formulation of this chapter. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Since the introduction of the ODEP in the early 1970's, the number and type of 
financial institutions operating in Egypt have increased enormously. This has 
resulted in financial resources being mobilised to a greater degree than ever before, 
whilst the import of modem banking technology has ensured that Egyptians 
employed within the financial sector have been able to work to higher degrees and 
standards of professionalism, serving a growing body of clients whose economic 
expectations have also increased. 
Popular conceptions about the role of the financial sector have changed, with people 
more willing to entrust savings to institutions, a process which has been aided by the 
inflow of remittances from abroad. It has been suggested that there is a greater 
awareness amongst the general public of the potential role of the sector in assisting 
economic and consequently social development. Whereas many people have readily 
and willingly accepted the import of Western banking technology, others have 
preferred to consider and pursue afresh traditional Islamic paths. The fact that 
Islamic banks and finance houses have proved to be so popular reflects such 
sentiment, likewise the degree of financial innovation which exists in Egypt today, 
and the increase in financial sophistication amongst the general public. 
Given such success it might be assumed that confidence is buoyant within the 
financial sector. This, however, is not the case, something indicated in the nature and 
scope of institutional activities. As has already been mentioned, loans made by 
banking institutions are, on the whole, short term. Although many of them take the 
form of rolling credit, thereby assuming the status of term credit, the very reluctance 
of the majority of institutions to forward a significant volume of capital in the form 
of medium, and particularly long term loans is indicative of a lack of confidence. 
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Similarly indicative is the volume of excess liquidity. If externally held savings are 
taken into account, Egypt's ratio of liquidity to GNP stands somewhere in the region 
of 160%, a figure under half that size being the norm for developing countries.^ 2 
This reflects not only the lack of confidence within the financial sector as a whole 
but a lack of perceived investment opportunities. 
Confidence can be described as a state and outiook which determines existing levels 
of performance and activity and has an equally significant impact in determining 
future levels of performance and activity. Whilst combining elements of the present 
and a speculative picture of the future, an atmosphere of confidence is also shaped by 
experience and perception of the past. 
One does not need to go as far back as the Nasser era to source why confidence is 
lacking within the financial community today. The very tools with which the 
Presidents Sadat and Mubarak have managed the economy have contributed to 
shaping this climate, as have the actions of the private sector itself. Of recent years, 
bank debt is considered to have been one of the major contributors to the generation 
of hesitancy within the sector. 
The total sum of bank debt involved currentiy stands in excess of £E4 billion with 
over four thousand clients in trouble. This figure represents 16.6% of all clients. 
The sums they owe represent 23.8% of all loans. Amongst the institutions worst 
affected are state owned banks, and business and investment banks - the latter being 
those institutions which deal uniquely in foreign currency. Over 40% of the clients 
92 Sayeh, Hamid Chairman of the Hong Kong Egyptian Bank & former Minister of the Economy 
in a private interview 
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of the state owned institutions are 'delinquent borrowers', and in the case of business 
and investment banks, almost 45% of loans are sour.93 
The cause of this debt can be traced to a large extent to the 50% devaluation of the 
Egyptian pound between 1984 and 1987, and the impact of world wide price 
fluctuations on agricultural goods. Firms which borrowed in foreign currencies but 
were earning in local currency had great difficulty in servicing loans in the midst of 
the spiralling downturn of the Egyptian pound. The problem of purchasing already 
scarce hard currency was made worse when the government clamped down on the 
'own exchange' market upon which much of the private sector had previously been 
reliant. It is also the case, however, that many banks had been rather lax in deciding 
which projects were worthy of investment, a lesson which has had a marked impact 
on lending policies today.94 
One of the most visible consequences of this debt crisis, and the subsequent crisis of 
confidence has been the departure from Cairo of a number of major players from the 
financial scene - particularly those institutions denied access to financial operations 
dealing with local currency. Among the institutions which left were the Bank of 
America, Lloyds and the Chase Manhattan Bank of New York. Whilst some of the 
departees had amassed bad debt in other parts of the world, the viability of pursuing 
business further in Egypt also underscored the reasoning behind their departure. As 
one senior banker described the situation to me, himself a temporary 'caretaker' for 
Lloyds in the wake of that institution's departure, "Banking is a risky business. 
When you lend money out there is only so much control that you can exercise over it 
and things can occur well beyond the control of anyone. The decision by these banks 
93 Middle East Economic Digest (London: Middle East Economic Digest 20 October 1989) p 8 
94 al-Tahri, Naveen in a private interview 
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to pack up does not mean that they lost money in Egypt - it could just mean that they 
saw no potential in Egypt for the time being." 
Such sentiment is not merely to be found amongst those who had departed the scene 
but is echoed amongst many of the financiers that remain. Citibank's spokesman 
told me, "Having forty employees in the bank and merely performing an advisory 
role is not exactly what we had in mind when we first opened up. I f we had more 
things to do we would gladly do them but at the same time we require guarantees that 
they might work and not just be a wasted effort." 
The financial sector is looking to the government to pursue a consistent line in 
economic policy which will embrace and exploit the financial sector in both the 
processes of change and the operation of its desired goals.^ ^ The current five year 
plan would appear to suggest that the government has a certain vision as to its chosen 
destiny in the twenty first century. The utterances of ministers similarly suggest an 
awareness of the enormous difficulties that must be faced in the pursuit of that goal. 
They also appear aware of the dangers of pursuing the alternative, in other words, 
maintaining existing policies. The financial sector claims to have the necessary 
apparatus and expertise to help bridge the gap. 
The most decisive gesture the government could adopt in bolstering confidence 
within the sector would be to adopt the prescriptive medicine of the International 
Monetary Fund.^^ This would not merely be an exercise aimed at freeing interest 
rates, and unifying and liberalising the rate of exchange rate but one entailing the 
wholesale adoption of market forces. 
9^ Fahmy, Maher of the Egyptian American Bank in a private interview 
9^ Sherif, Khaled Fouad in a private interview 
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Dr Nabil Mohareb of the Misr Iran Development Bank explained why the sector 
regards this as so important. "The first thing to be done for any economic reform to 
be meaningful is to establish markets. I f you do not start with this as a first step, all 
subsequent steps and efforts will go down the drain." 
The adoption of market forces as a tool to manage the economy would inevitably 
create vast short term difficulties. The cost of borrowing would be forced up for the 
government, necessitating a dramatic change in attitude over subsidies; an increase in 
interest rates might deter banks from lending as heavily as the government would 
desire; a liberalisation of exchange rates would result in further devaluation, forcing 
badly capitalised companies to go under, possibly even some financial institutions; 
capital flight might also be stimulated in an atmosphere enabling the free transferral 
of foreign exchange to and from Egypt. 
However, despite the potentially bleak scenario, many believe that the problems are 
both short-term and containable and that to cope with them the government could 
rely to a large extent on the private sector and financial community, thereby further 
stimulating confidence, diversity and development within the sector and elsewhere. 
112 
5.2 Management of Domestic Public Debt 
By the mid-1980's the government was reliant on the banking sector to the tune of 
over 50% as its source of finance for the public sector deficit. The rest came from 
savings that had accumulated in social insurance and pension funds, proceeds from 
investment certificates and funds from the post office savings organisation. Whilst 
these sources have been accessible, reliable and cheap for the government, the use of 
them has served to deter the stimulation of money and capital markets. 
As a possible alternative means of managing debt, it has been suggested that the 
government could tap markets for future borrowings, calculating the volume of 
treasury bonds and bills to be issued to cover the expected annual budget deficit. If 
the government was to restrict such borrowing to the financing of purely 
governmental needs, as opposed to those of state owned enterprises, the volume of 
bills required to be issued would be inevitably reduced. 
The pursuit of such a policy would not only serve to boost the financial community 
and its regard for government and its policy directions but act as a device whereby 
the government would be forced to address the whole problem of the deficit. 
Mohareb, Nabil S in a private interview 
9^  Mohareb, Nabil S in a private interview 
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5.3 Monetary Policy 
As noted, the impact of the government's monetary policies has been to increase the 
proportion of savings held as time deposits held in banks. Whilst this is a laudable 
goal in itself, the fact that this has served as a pool to finance increases in domestic 
debt is less encouraging. 
Similarly, whilst the government has endeavoured to restrain the money supply and 
reduce inflation through the imposition of a ceiling on aggregate bank credit, this has 
been applied to all sectors bar the government itself. As such, this has the effect of 
greatly reducing the desirable impact of such a policy. 
Interest rate policies have been similarly distorting. Some of those bankers 
interviewed considered, from their own lending experience, that the ceilings on loan 
rates have discouraged investment on high risk projects, particularly agriculture and 
industry. The result, they claimed, has been to promote investment in capital 
intensive and short term projects, such as trade. Although the IMF has urged the 
government to alter such policies, it was suggested to the author that the impact on 
lending activity of a liberalisation of interest rates would be slight. The experience 
of bank debt, as mentioned earlier, coupled with the extremely lengthy process of 
debt recovery, will continue to act as a deterrent, some bankers suggested. 
These days, lending practices are underscored with extreme caution, particularly 
where foreign currency loans are concerned. Lending in foreign currency is now 
restricted to those economic concerns which generate foreign currency, and even 
then only after strict credit criterion have been applied and accepted. 
99 Various sources 
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A boost to lending activities could come about, suggested some, through enhanced 
awareness of the role, techniques and requirements of the financial sector. A good 
many projects are turned down on account of would-be borrowers approaching 
institutions with capitalisation as low as 15% - 20%.!^ The danger resulting from 
would-be clients being turned away is that they will be forced to turn to more 
expensive, informal sources of finance. 
The quality and timeliness of data is another major factor which has deterred lending 
activity. It has increased risk resulting in projects either being deemed unfeasible, or 
the levels of guarantees and coUateralisation required being increased. 
5.4 Management of the Public Business Sector 
One of the greatest obstacles to investment perceived by the financial community is 
the state sector. It is not merely the size of the sector which deters would-be 
investors - it constitutes 70% of the economy - but the manner in which the 
government manages the array of state owned enterprises (SOEs) which make it up. 
Largely the product of nationalisation, these SOEs have been nurtured since the era 
of Abd al-Nasser by direct subsidies and public investment, and financed with 
subsidised credit. The cost of running these enterprises in this manner constitutes a 
major part of the annual budget deficit. 
Many in the financial sector are extremely hesitant about backing any private concern 
which might find itself in competition with such enterprises, as despite their 
inefficiency and wastefulness, the government has only ever demonstrated great 
al-Tahri, Naveen in a private interview 
Representative of the University of Ain Shams 
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commitment to maintaining them. Yet, where the private sector has entered into 
competition with SOEs - according to Khaled Fouad Sherif of the American 
University in Cairo - it has revealed the extent of the inadequacies of the state sector, 
whether in terms of management, capital make-up, productivity or efficiency. 
Managers are neither accountable nor responsible for their operations, lacking the 
freedom to hire and fire employees - let alone dictate the ideal numbers who should 
be employed; they are denied the opportunity to secure finance on properly 
advantageous and realistic terms; and they are denied the right to determine the 
inviability of operations where appropriate. 
In certain sectors, most notably tourism, the government has actively encouraged the 
private sector's participation and involvement. The Minister for Tourism and 
Aviation, Fouad Sultan, reeled off to me the impact he sees the private sector as 
having made in the late 1980's: the number of tourist arrivals having doubled and 
the number of tourist nights having tripled; income having risen from $700 million to 
$2.5 billion in three years; and the total number of hotel rooms approaching 50,000. 
The act of the government permitting the private sector's widespread participation in 
the tourism sector has been of enormous encouragement to the financial sector, he 
claimed, part of a policy aimed at, "...making the private sector feel its contributions 
are badly needed". 
The government has recognised the success of this project and in 1990 it announced a 
programme for the privatisation of 300 joint venture companies with an estimated 
total capital value of about £E 1.5 billion; 2000 small firms with capital totalling £E 
600 million; and 380 non-strategic public enterprises, of which 200 are in 
manufacturing. The Minister in charge of the day to day running of the project -
again Fouad Sultan - explained to me what the government has in mind in embarking 
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on such an exercise. " I believe in privatisation - not just as an end in itself but as an 
effective tool in bridging the gap between the central budget of the government and 
in increasing and improving efficiency in the production process." 
Egypt, he suggested, differs from most other developing countries in several 
respects, notably the presence of a strong production base. That this base is not 
performing to maximum capacity is not a characteristic unique to Egypt but in her 
particular case attributable to the lack of resources available to meet working capital 
needs and renovation. The government can no longer look to living off a budget 
deficit which impacts in such a negative manner on the economy as a whole. 
Clearly, a privatisation exercise could be a most effective tool in bridging the gap in 
the government's budget, mobilising the resources and savings of the community and 
binding them to the production base. With liquidity standing well in excess of most 
developing countries - a vast volume of Egyptian savings being held overseas, there 
could be scope in absorbing this, helping to satisfy potential investment opportunities 
to the satisfaction of the financial community. Nevertheless, as was apparent 
amongst all those with whom I discussed the government's programme, before 
implementing it the government will be required to enact a great many pieces of 
supportive legislation for it to be a success. 
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5.5 Other Issues 
An American diplomat spelt out his thoughts about the capabilities of the financial 
sector in sustaining the exercise. " I do believe that the government is very serious 
and willing to privatise but they are faced by a great many problems, as essentially 
there is no market for financial assets and securities. They lack a reference price, the 
necessary quantity surveyors, assessors and evaluators. They need all of these things 
to assess how much of this share can be sold to the public." 
US AID, he explained, were undertaking feasibility studies to assess some of the 
issues surrounding these aspects of the exercise. Once complete, the Capital Markets 
Authority will then report their findings and any recommendations to the 
government. Some of those who were questioned - the diplomat included - feared 
that local human resources were inadequate to carry out the exercise, others were 
deeply defensive of local Egyptian talent, and highly critical of the role of US AID. 
I f the government intends to privatise through the stock exchange, Maher Fahmy, 
Vice President of the Cairo Exchange suggested that existing legislation should be 
amended to ensure that stocks and shares be on the same footing as bank interest. 
Others suggested that the government should go as far as exercising positive 
discrimination in favour of stocks and shares. This would certainly be a measure that 
could enhance awareness in the exchange and act as an incentive for would-be 
investors. 
It is widely hoped that the government's new policy will herald a wider and fresh 
outlook on management of the public sector as a whole, and particularly for those 
concerns ear-marked for privatisation. Several bankers said that they would flatly 
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refuse to put money into any concern managed under existing legislation or by means 
of traditional Egyptian public sector practice. "They must first of all rid themselves 
of the individuals that led the organisations into that state. If they change the laws, 
many Egyptians and foreign investors will go in and buy from such a market", 
suggested one of them. 
Whilst there could be clear advantage for investors purchasing shares as a means of 
hedging their investments against inflation - as opposed to relying on insubstantial 
bank interest income - the development of the stock exchange could also prove to be 
of great appeal to 'Islamic investors', those who prefer not to deal in traditional 
'Western' banking techniques. With many investors having been bitten and deterred 
from financial innovation and participation as a result of the al-Rayan scandals, the 
financial sector is aware of how much work it must do to re-capture these potential 
investors and indeed restore confidence through-out the economy. 
Other groups must also be satisfied. Europe's 1992 venture could provide ready 
markets for Egyptian products yet at the same time could also result in foreign aid 
resources being diverted from Egypt to Eastern Europe. Most bankers remain 
optimistic for the long term, recognising - as they believe the government and the 
people of Egypt have also done, both the inevitability and the need for change. 
The extent to which the government will be able to wrestle these issues through 
parliament and convince the people of their validity and benefit is questioned 
constantly. The scale of the doubt certainly underlies something of President 
Mubarak and his colleagues' hesitancy, although it also reflects the 'old-guard' 
military-cum-conservative political thinking of many of his Ministers, few of whom 
have business or commercial experience. 
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To successfully implement these policies the government must - at least in the short 
term - adopt a strong hand approach. Yet, the end result of the exercise must be the 
government relinquishing much of its power, a significant portion of which it has 
assumed since the 1950's. 
120 
Chapter 6 Conclusions 
The framework around which this analysis of the growth and development of the 
modem Egyptian financial sector is structured is sewn in chapter 2 of this thesis. In 
this chapter we are led through a theoretical-style approach into considering the 
'ideal' role for the 'ideal' financial sector before revealing the broad pattern of 
historical development in the developing world. It also introduces the notion of 
supply-lead and demand-follow finance - wherein lies the initiative to promote 
change and development, whether with the government, or the private and financial 
sectors. The faults to which financial sectors have historically fallen victim in 
pursuit of development are discussed along with some of the areas of activity 
governments have been urged to adopt in an attempt to rectify such situations and 
regain the path towards the 'ideal'. 
Applying the findings of this chapter to the information contained in those that 
follow suggests that Egypt's historical experience of financial development is not 
unique. Emerging from the decaying Ottoman Empire, Egypt's economy became 
inter-woven with that of the outside world through both the West's colonial 
expansionist policies and their immediate impact on the narrow economic practices of 
the Egyptian government. The cotton trade and the Suez Canal's development 
compounded this process. Although both involved significant Egyptian input, 
whether in terms of labour, cost or expertise, access to finance remained well beyond 
the reach of most native Egyptians. They continued to pursue their financial affairs 
by traditional techniques and methods but were clearly drawn and attracted to what 
they saw being operated by the Europeans in their midst. 
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It was not until the 1920's that local Egyptian input into the financial sector became 
evident with the creation of the Banque Misr. This was an initiative welling from the 
private sector, and of significance in that it was neither aided directly by the 
government, nor the occupying colonial powers. The bank's development was aided 
indirectly by the government in its determination to support new industries, through 
the application and maintenance of a programme of tariffs. 
This trend of nigh-unique private sector participation in the financial sector continued 
up until the 1950's when, following the implementation of policies of sequestration, 
confiscation and nationalisation, the initiative was placed firmly in the hands of the 
government. Its actions were to suppress the involvement and contribution of the 
private sector. The government not merely held the reigns enabling it to determine 
the flow of resources, it also owned or had very significant powers of administration 
over the generators of wealth. 
Although it took the death of Gamal Abd al-Nasser to shake this direct style of 
economic management from Egypt, his successors have each proved reluctant to rely 
significantly on the workings of the market and the private sector to aid and facilitate 
the process of allocation and distribution. 
The 1970's were years characterised by phenomenal financial development, the 
numbers and types of institutions increasing dramatically, patterns of ownership 
changing and recognition of the importance of the sector growing within government 
circles. Foreign banks flooded into Egypt, acknowledging the government's 
determination to accept something of a role for the private sector, keen also to take 
advantage of Egypt's new found sources of wealth. It is debatable whether the 
financial community would have emerged as it did had Egypt not suddenly found 
herself in the position of amassing significant foreign exchange earnings and adopting 
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trade liberalisation policies. It is equally debatable how tolerant the government 
would have been had the banks not provided such ready access to the government's 
deficit finance. 
Underlying the boom of the 1970's were great economic structural weaknesses and a 
dominant and overwhelming state sector. When the extent of the weaknesses became 
exposed in the 1980's and some of the sources of foreign exchange were proving less 
forthcoming, Egypt witnessed the departure of some of the major foreign financial 
institutions which had made such a decisive gesture in undertaking operations in 
Cairo in the 1970's. Such a demonstration of how market forces can operate 
reminded the government of Egypt of the precarious world it had chosen to admit 
herself to with the implementation of the ODEP. 
Equally indicative of the depressed nature of the economy and the lack of domestic 
confidence was the volume of foreign exchange held by Egyptians both within and 
outside the country - good money driving out bad. Yet, this phenomena also 
suggests something of the heightened financial sophistication of the general public. 
Traditional saving sources had been tapped and the financial community had enabled 
them to be converted to a form suitable for productive and efficient investment. 
Although many of the institutions which commenced operations in Egypt in the 
1970's have done enormously well, and that it is only a minority which fared badly 
as a result of bad debt, a general lack of investment opportunities points to the 
shallowness of the sector. Bond and bill markets are underdeveloped; the stock 
exchange fails to function with any great degree of success, or impact; and, the 
banks are reluctant to lend much beyond the short, or medium term. 
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The sector looks to the government for gestures and psychological signals to bolster 
confidence, whilst at the same time the government would appear to be looking more 
and more to the sector to aid its way out of some of the great difficulties it faces. It 
remains to be seen whether the government's signals will be decisive enough to 
stimulate co-operation with the sector, and indeed whether the sector possesses the 
necessary expertise, flexibility and commitment to make real the government's 
vision. 
It would be wrong for the government and the people of Egypt to regard the financial 
sector as a generator of wealth in itself. A well functioning sector acts as a 
facilitator of wealth creation, capable of exercising the specialist skills of search, 
discrimination and allocation. Recent history has demonstrated that the government 
of Egypt lacks these necessary skills and that reliance on the financial sector is 
paramount. It has also demonstrated that a financial sector can, and indeed will only 
pursue these functions and operate effectively in a climate shaped with sensitivity by 
the actions and dictates of government. 
An analysis of the concept and practice of development must recognise the 
inevitability of both change and time, and change occurring over time; it must 
recognise development as a concept embodying inter-relationships - that one thing 
cannot develop in isolation and without impact on those that surround; it must 
recognise that development is not always self-generated but can come from outwith; 
that development is a timeless process to which labels of success, failure and 
conclusion cannot be easily attached, yet is a process to which are often attached 
immediate and popularly conceived goals and ideals. 
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Egypt has a concept of history, statehood and being more profound than most states. 
Although change within the financial sector over the past three decades may have 
been nigh-constant, and masterfully erratic for 'sound-bitten' observers of the 
twentieth century, the forbearing of the Egyptian people and the very nature of 
development makes it hard for us to assess now the impact and even significance of 
all that has been occurring of recent at the banks of the Nile. 
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National Bank of Egypt Economic Bulletin 
National Development Bank 
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Individuals / representatives of institutions consulted (ordered alphabetically by 




Hegazi, Abdel Aziz 
Mahmoud, Karim 
Mohareb, Nabil S 
Sayeh, Hamid 
Sherif, Khaled Fouad 
Sultan, Fouad 
al Tahri, Naveen 
Thani, Ashraf 
Vice President of the Cairo Stock Exchange 
Lawyer, former Chairman of the 1981 Companies 
Law Committee 
Egyptian American Bank 
Former Prime Minister 
Misr America International 
Misr Iran Development Bank 
Chairman of the Hong Kong Egyptian Bank, former 
Minister of the Economy 
American University in Cairo, USAID, journalist 
Minister of Tourism & Aviation, formerly with the 
Misr Iran Development Bank 
Commercial International Bank 
Institute of Banking & Finance 
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Institutions Consulted (ordered alphabetically by name of institution) 
NB This refers on occasions to individuals who preferred not to have their names 
associated with their remarks, unlike those in the above mentioned list. 
Ain Shams University, Cairo 
American University in Cairo 
Bank of America, Cairo 
Barclays Bank 
Cairo University 
Capital Markets Authority 
Central Bank of Egypt 
Citibank 
Embassy of the United Kingdom, Cairo 
Embassy of the United States of America, Cairo 
International Finance Corporation, Cairo 
USAID Offices, Cairo 
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